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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
20th March 1957.
BHAGWATI, SINHA AND KAPUR, JJ.
Newspapers Ltd., Appellant
Versus
State Industrial Tribunal U.P. and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. P. Sinha, Senior Advocate, (Mr. S. N. Mukherjee, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; Messrs. G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, Advocates, for Respondent No. 2,
T, respondent No.3, was employed as a linotypist by the appellant Company. He was dismissed on May 8, 1952 on allegations of incompetence under Rule 12(ii) of the Standing Orders of the appellant Company. It was alleged that the dismissal of respondent No. 3 was welcomed by his co-workers and other workmen in the employ of the appellant Company and they made no grievance of it, nor did they espouse his cause. The case of respondent No.3 was not taken up by any Union of workers of the appellant Company nor by any of the Unions of workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the U.P. Working Journalists Unions Lucknow, with which respondent No.3 had no connection whatsoever, took the matter to the Conciliation Board Allahabad. Ultimately, the U.P. Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on June 3, 1953 by a notification, the prefatory words of which were :
"Whereas an industrial dispute in respect of the matters hereinafter specified exists between the concern known as Newspapers, Ltd., Allahabad and its workmen, and whereas in the opinion of the Governor it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order and for maintaining employment"
One of the questions referred was: whether the service of Shri T lino-operator was wrongly terminated by the management.
On February 13, 1953 the State Industrial Tribunal at Allahabad decided in favour of respondent No. 3 and ordered his reinstatement "without break in continuity of service" and also ordered the payment of his wages for the period during which he remained dismissed. An appeal was taken by the appellant Company to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who by its order dated February 24, 1953, affirmed the order of the Tribunal with costs. The appellant Company then moved a petition in the Allahabad High Court under Art., 226 of the Constitution but this was dismissed and a special appeal against this judgment was also dismissed. The appellant Company then came to the Supreme Court in appeal with a certificate under Art. 133(1) (c) of the Constitution.
Held: (1) Taking into consideration the whole tenor of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, and the rules framed there under, the dispute did not fall within the definition of an industrial dispute as used in that Act or in section 2(k) of the (Central) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The reference therefore of that dispute by the Government was bad.
(2) The use of the word "workmen" in the plural in the definition of industrial dispute does not by itself exclude the applicability of the Act to an individual dispute because under section 13(2) of General Clauses Act, "Unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject (11) words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa."
But in order to get its true import it is necessary to view the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it, the evils it was no end and the objects it was to sub-serve. The Act has, therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention determined by construing all the constituent parts of the Act together and not by taking detached sections or by taking one word here and another there. So construed the provisions of the D.P. Act show that the machinery of the Act has been devised with the object of maintaining industrial peace so as to prevent interference with public safety or public order or with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community or of employment. The Act is based on the necessity of achieving collective amity between labour and capital by means of conciliation, mediation and adjudication. The object of the Act is the prevention of industrial strife, strikes and lock-outs and the promotion of industrial peace and not to take the place of the ordinary tribunal of the land for the enforcement of contracts between an employer and an individual workman. Thus viewed the provisions of the Act lead to the conclusion that its applicability to an individual dispute as opposed to dispute involving a group of workmen is excluded unless it acquires the general characteristic of an industrial dispute, viz. the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with the individual workman and thus create conditions contemplated by section 3 of the D.P. Act which is the foundation of State Governmental action under that Act. The other provisions which follow that action only sub-serve the carrying out of the object of the Act specified therein.
(3) The use of the words "workmen" and "workman" in Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Act is indicative of intention of the Act being applicable to collective disputes and not to individual ones, and this is fortified by the finality and the binding effect to awards by Rule 28 and more specially by section 18 of the Central Act which makes awards binding not only on the individuals present or represented but on all workmen employed in the establishment and even on future entrants.
Rules 4,5 and 15 of the Rules cannot be a valid foundation for sustaining the argument raised that individual dispute was within the definition of industrial dispute. Ordinarily, the award of a Tribunal binds or affects the rights of the parties to the proceedings but awards of indoor affects the rights of the parties to the proceedings but awards of Industrial Tribunals have extended implications and may affect the rights of all workmen of a concern or undertaking and even the future entrants. This doctrine of representation which enlarges the meaning of parties in the D.P. and Central Acts is an essential idea associated with industrial disputes and supports collectiveness as opposed to individualism.
The prohibition under Rule 26 of the D.P. Act and section 33 of the Central Act against any change in conditions of service during the pendency of the proceedings the object of which is to ensure discipline and industrial truce during that period also supports the basic idea of collectiveness in industrial disputes.
(4) Moreover, the Rules cannot be read in a way as would be tanta. mount to enlarging the scope of the expression "industrial dispute" and also the powers conferred on the State Government under section 3 of the D.P. Act. The executive cannot under the power of framing rules and regulations clothe itself with powers which the statute itself does not give and which are inconsistent with the interpretation put on the expression "industrial dispute". The cardinal rule in regard to promulgation of bye-laws or making rules is that they must be legi fitei rationi consona, and therefore all regulations which are contrary or repugnant to statutes under which they are made are ineffective. If the expression industrial dispute as ordinarily understood and construed convey the dispute between the employer on one hand and the workmen acting collectively on the other, then the definition of those words cannot be widened by a statutory rule or regulation promulgated under the statute or by executive fiat.
(5) In spite of the fact that the making of a reference by the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act is the exercise of its administrative powers, that is not destructive of the right of an aggrieved party to show what was referred was not industrial dispute at all and therefore the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal to make the award can be questioned, even though the factual existence of the dispute may not be subject to the partys challenge.
Judgement
KAPUR, J: - The ground on which the appellant company seeks to have the order of the Industrial Tribunal set aside is that no industrial dispute existed within the meaning of the expression as used in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Act XXVIII Of 1947) (hereinafter called the U.P. Act) and consequently the U.P. Government had no power to make the reference in question. Industrial Dispute is defined in S. 2 of the U.P. Act as having the same meaning assigned to it as in S. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter termed the Central Act). There this expression has been defined in S. 2(k) to mean:
"any dispute or difference between employers & employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."
2. The controversy between the parties arose in the following circumstances:
3. Tajammul Hussain, respondent No. 3 was employed as a lino typist by the appellant company. He was dismissed on May 8, 1952 on allegations of incompetence under R. 12 (ii) of the Standing Orders of the appellant company. It was alleged that the dismissal of Respondent No. 3 was welcomed by his co-workers and other workmen in the employment of the appellant company and they made no grievance of it, nor did they espouse his cause.
4. The case of respondent No. 3 was not taken up by any union of workers of the appellant company nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the U.P. Working Journalist Union, Lucknow, with which Respondent No. 3 had no connection whatsoever, took the matter to the Conciliation Board, Allahabad. Ultimately, the U.P. Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on June 3, 1953 by notification; the prefatory words of which are:
"Whereas an industrial dispute in respect of the matters hereinafter specified exists between the concern known as Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad and its workmen; and whereas in the opinion of the Governor, it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order and for maintaining employment........."
One of the questions referred was:
"Whether the services of Sri Tajammul Hussain Lino Operator were wrongfully terminated by the Management......."
5. On February 13, 1953, the State Industrial Tribunal at Allahabad decided in favour of respondent No. 3 and ordered his reinstatement "without break of continuity of service" and also ordered the payment of his wages for the period during which he "remained dismissed". An appeal was taken by the appellant company to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who by its order dated February 24, 1953 affirmed the order of the Tribunal with costs. The appellant company then moved a petition in the Allahabad High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution but this was dismissed by Bhargava J. on January 6, 1954, and a special appeal with a certificate against this judgment was also dismissed. The appellant company has come up in appeal with a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution.
6. The controversy which arises in this case is whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within the definition of Industrial dispute as used in the U.P. Act. In order to resolve this controversy it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the U.P. Act and the relevant rules made thereunder. The preamble of the Act runs: ".............. to provide for powers to prevent strikes and lock-outs, and for the settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental matters". Section 3 of the Act confers certain powers on the State Government for the purpose of prevention of strikes, lock-outs, etc. The portion of this section relevant for the purpose of this appeal reads as follows:
"If in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of public order or su
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