1957 Supreme(SC) 37

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
5th April, 1957
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., IMAM, S.K. DAS, MENON AND SARKAR, JJ.
Ramji Lal Modi, Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P., Respondent.
Petn. No. 252 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Veda Vyasa Senior Advocate, (M/s. S. K. Kapur Ganapat Rai, Advocates, with him), for Petitioner, M/s G. C. Mathur, and C. P. Lal, Advocates, for Respondent.

Headnote:Articles 19 (2), 19 (I) (a), 25, 26-Penal Code, S. 295-A, if protected by Art. 19 (2)-Meaning of in the interest of" in Article 19 (2);

       It was urged: S. 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and void inasmuch as it interferes with the petitioners right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to him as a citizen of India by Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution. This section cannot be supported as a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Art. 19 (1) (a) as provided in cl. (2) of the said Article. The interest of public order is the only thing in cI. (2) which may possibly be relied upon by the State as affording a justification for its claim for the validity of the impugned section. A law interfering with the freedom of speech and expression and imposing a punishment for its breach may be "in the interest of public order" only if the likelihood of public disorder is made an ingredient of the offence and the prevention of public disorder is a matter of proximate and not remote consideration. Insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of India may not lead to public disorder in all cases although it may do so in some cases. Therefore, where a law purports, as the impugned section does, to authorise the imposition of restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of constitutionally permissible legislature action affecting such right, the Court should not uphold it even in so far as it ,may be applied within the constitutionally permissible limits as it is not severable.

       Held (dismissing the application): (1) The language employed in the amended clause (2) of Article 19 is "in the interests of" and not "for the maintained of". The expression "in the interests of" makes the ambit of the protection very wide. A law may not have been designed

       1. Reversing A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 120.

       to directly maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interest of public order.

       The right to freedom of religion assured by Articles 25, 26 of the Constitution is expressly made subject to public order, morality and health. Therefore, it cannot be predicated that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on the maintenance of public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order. Those two Articles in terms contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the interests of public order.

       (2) Section 295A, Indian Penal Code falls well within the protection of cl. (2) of Art. 19, as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a).

       "In the first place d. (2) of Art. 19 protects a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, and expression in the interest of public order, which is much wider than for maintenance of public order. If, therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder, a law penalising such activities, as an offence cannot but be held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction in the interests of public order although in some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public order. In the next place S. 295A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion offered unwillingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section, which penalises such activities, is well within the protection cl. (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing resonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(I)(a). Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by the impugned section, there cannot, in our opinion, be any possibility of this law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the constitution. In other words the language employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) and consequently the question of severability does not arise." (Per S. R. Das C.].)