The disqualification under cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the U. P. Municipalities Act attaches on the date of filing nominations and is not wiped off by subsequent payment of arrears of tax.

Judgement

S. K. DAS, J, - This appeal has been preferred to this Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad on 3rd February 1956, to the effect that the case is a fit one for appeal to the SC under Ar. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The question that falls for decision is the true scope, meaning and effect of cl. (g) of S. 13-D, U. P. Municipalities Act (U. P. Act No. II of 1916), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

2. The relevant facts, which are not now in dispute, are these. There was a general election to the Municipal Board of Bareilly in October 1953. The appellant, Mangoo Singh, and respondent No. 3, Imdad Husain, along with several others, were candidates at the said election from Ward No. 15. The date fixed for filing nominations was 5th October 1953, and the date for scrutiny of the nominations filed was 7th October 1953.

The appellant and respondent No. 3 both filed their nominations on the due date, and at the time scrutiny Imdad Husain raised an objection to the nomination of the appellant on the ground that the latter was disqualified under cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act for being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board because he was in arrears in the payment of Municipal Tax in excess of one year s demand.

This objection was dismissed, and the nomination of the appellant was accepted by the Assistant Officer. The poll took Place on 26th October 1953, and the counting of votes was done on 29th October 1953. Four persons were to be elected from the said Ward, and the appellant was the third in the list by reason of the number of votes which he had obtained. Imadad Hussain was fifth in the list.

Accordingly, the appellant was declared as one of the returned candidates, and Imdad Husain was at the top of the unsuccessful candidates. Imdad Husain then filed an election petition to act aside the election of the present appellant on various grounds. The only ground with which we are now concerned is the disqualification under cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act.

This election petition was held by the Election Tribunal and by its judgment dated 20th October 1954, the Election Tribunal held that the appellant was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one year s damage to which S. 166 of the Act applied and therefore came under the disqualification in cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act.

It further held that the payment of a sum of Rs. 115-3-0 on 10th October 1953, five days after the date fixed for the filing of nominations, did not wipe off that disqualification, and, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to S. 13 D of the Act. It may be here stated that the Election Tribunal also held that no bill for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant as required by S. 166, nor was any demand notice served on him as required by S. 168 of the Act.

On the above findings, the Tribunal allowed the election petition, set aside the election of the appellant and declared, a casual vacancy under cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of S. 25 of the Act, which vacancy was subsequently filled up by the election of respondent 3 on 5th April 1955. The next general election in the Municipality is due in October 1957.

3. Against the decision of the Election Tribunal, the appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for the issue of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The main point urged by the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in its interpretation of cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act Chaturvedi J., who dealt with the application of the appellant, agreed with the view of the law as expressed by the Election Tribunal and dismissed the application.

The appellant then preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court. This appeal was also dismissed by Agarwala and Sahai JJ., by their judgment dated 30th August 1955. The appellant then moved and obtained a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution from the said High C