The Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to allow an employer to substitute its application for permission to discharge employees under one clause of the Standing Orders for its original application for permission to dismiss them under another clause, provided that the application is bona fide and not actuated by any oblique motives.

Judgment

BHAGWATI J. : This appeal with special leave arises out of an application made by the appellant to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar under S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") seeking permission to discharge the respondents from its employ.

2. The respondents were in the employ of the appellant and were staying in a two storeyed house in the city of Patna which had been rented by the appellant for housing its workmen. On 29-11-1952, an occurrence took place in the said house wherein the respondents were involved. Written reports of the said occurrence were sent on 21-11-1952, to the appellant s Chief Engineer and the respondents were placed under suspension the same day. An industrial dispute was then pending between the parties i. e., the appellant and its workmen before the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar and the appellant therefore made an application to the said Tribunal under S. 33 of the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents on the ground of misconduct as per Cl. 17 (b) (viii) of the appellant s Standing Orders. On 27-12-1952, the respondents also made an application before the said Tribunal under S. 33A of the Act inter alia on the ground that their suspension by the appellant as aforesaid was a breach of S. 33 of the Act.

3. On 6-12-1952, the appellant made an application before the said Tribunal stating that on a reconsideration of the facts of the case of the respondents the original prayer for permission to dismiss the respondents was not being pressed, and for the ends of justice it would be sufficient if the appellant was granted permission to discharge the respondents under clause 14 (a) of the Standing Orders instead of the original prayer for dismissal under Cl. 17 (b) (viii) thereof. This application was resisted by the respondents. The Industrial Tribunal, however, entertained the same and after hearing the parties duly made its award on 14-5-1953, dismissing the respondents application under S. 33A of the Act and granting the appellant permission to discharge the respondents from its employ with effect from the date of the order on payment to the respondents of one month s pay in lieu of notice within 15 days therefrom.

4. The respondents carried an appeal against the said order of the Industrial Tribunal granting the appellant s application under S. 33 of the Act before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. Calcutta. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the appellant before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that no substantial question of law was involved and as such the appeal was not maintainable. The Labour Appellate Tribunal was of the opinion that the appellant had alleged misconduct against respondents and could not be allowed to adopt the expedient of terminating their services by giving notice for the requisite period or payment of salary in lieu of notice and that the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, ought not to have entertained the application for amendment of the prayer of the original application in which the appellant wanted to dismiss the respondents for misconduct. This according to the Labour Appellate Tribunal was a substantial question of law and it therefore entertained the appeal. The Labour Appellate Tribunal thereafter considered whether the appellant had made out a case under Cl. 17 (b) (viii) of the Standing Orders and came to the conclusion that the respondents had not been guilty of any misconduct within the meaning of that clause and that therefore the order made by the Industrial Tribunal granting permission to the appellant to terminate the services of the respondents was liable to be set aside. In so far, however, as after obtaining the permission from the Industrial Tribunal the appellant had given notice of discharge to the respondents, the Labour Appellate Tribunal expressed its inability to give the respondents any substantial relief either in the shape of re-instatement or compensation.

5. The appellant has come up