The intention to cause death is not necessary for an offence to be considered murder under Section 300 "thirdly" of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution must prove the presence of a bodily injury, the nature of the injury, the intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, and that the injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

Judgment

V. BOSE, J. : The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh. He was granted special leave of appeal by this Court but the leave is limited to

"the question that on the finding accepted by the Punjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner."

The appellant was tried with five others under Ss. 302/149, and 323/149 and 323/ 149, Indian Penal Code. He was also charged individually under S. 302.

The others were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were convicted under Ss. 326, 324 and 323 read with S. 149, Indian Penal Code. On appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted.

2. The appellant was convicted by the first Court under S. 302 and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court.

3. There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the appellant caused it. It was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh, while he was still alive, said that it was

"a punctured wound 2" x 1 /2" transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal."

He also said that

"Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound."

4. The incident occurred about 8 p.m. on July 13, 1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day.

5. The doctor who conducted the postmortem described the injury as -

"an oblique incised stitched wound 2 1/2" on the lower part of left side of belly, 1 3/4" above the left inguinal ligament. The injury was through the whole thickness of the abdominal wall. Peritonitis was present and there was digested food in that cavity. Flakes of pus were sticking round the small intestines and there were six cuts ..... at various places, and digested food was flowing out from three cuts."

The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

6. The learned Sessions Judge found that the appellant was 21 or 22 years old and said -

"When the common object of the assembly seems to have been to cause grievous hurts only, I do not suppose Virsa Singh actually had the intention to cause the death of Khem Singh, but by a rash and silly act he gave a rather forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death. Peritonitis also supervened and that hastened the death of Khem Singh. But for that Khem Singh may perhaps not have died or may have lived a little longer."

Basing on those facts, he said that the case fell under S. 300 "thirdly" and so he convicted under s. 302, Indian Penal Code.

7. The learned High Court Judges considered that "the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a chance meeting." But they accepted the finding that the appellant inflicted the injury on Khem Singh and accepted the medical testimony that the blow was a fatal one.

8. It was argued with much circumlocution that the facts set out above do not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Section 300 "thirdly" was quoted :

"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."

It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."

9. This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first par