An enquiry conducted by an employer in a dismissal case must comply with the principles of natural justice, including the right of the employee to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses, and to be provided with copies of statements made against him.

Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - S. 7, 15 - DISMISSAL OF WORKMAN - ENQUIRY - PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE - VIOLATION - COMPENSATION.
Fact of the Case:

The appellant company dismissed a workman, Das, on the charge of theft of two wheels complete with tyres and tubes from the company's lorry. The dismissal was challenged by the union and a reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the dismissal was not justified due to improper procedure and lack of legal evidence, and awarded compensation to Das.
Finding of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the enquiry conducted by the company was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice as the witnesses against Das were not examined in his presence, copies of their statements were not provided to him, and the statements were not read out to him before he was asked to question the witnesses. The Court also held that the defect in the enquiry could have been cured if the company had produced the witnesses before the Tribunal and given Das an opportunity to cross-examine them, but this was not done.
Issues: 1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was a competent tribunal under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. Whether the award of the Tribunal was sustainable in law.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the question of the Tribunal's competence under S. 7 of the Act could not be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court as it was not raised before the Tribunal and the necessary facts to determine the Tribunal's qualification were not investigated. 2. The Court held that the Tribunal's finding that the dismissal was not justified due to improper procedure was correct as the enquiry conducted by the company violated the principles of natural justice. The Court also held that the Tribunal was not sitting in appeal on the enquiry held by the company, but was justified in concluding that the dismissal was unjustified based on the finding of improper procedure.
Final Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the award of the Tribunal, limiting the grant of compensation to Das to the sum of Rs. 11,125 deposited in the Court.

Judgment

K. N. WANCHOO J. : This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter. The appellant is the Phulbari Tea Estate (hereinafter called the company). The case relates to the dismissal of one workman namely B. N. Das (hereinafter called Das), which had been taken up by the Assam Chah Karmchari Sangh, which is a registered trade union. A reference was made by the Government of Assam on 8-3-l956, to the Industrial Tribunal on the question whether the dismissal of Das was justified; and if not, whether he was entitled to reinstatement with or without compensation or any other relief in lieu thereof. Das was dismissed by the company on 12-3-1955. The charge against him was that on the night of February 6/7, 1955, he along with one Samson, also an employee of the company, committed theft of two wheels complete with tyres and tubes from the company s lorry, which amounted to gross misconduct under the Standing Orders. The case was reported to the police and Das as well as Samson were arrested. Das remained in Jail up to 25~2-1955, when he was released on bail. He reported for duty on February 28; but the manager suspended him for ten days from March 1. Thereafter he was served with a charge sheet on 10~3-1955, asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed for gross misconduct as mentioned above. He gave a reply on March 11 that as the case was sub judice in the criminal court, the question of dismissal did not arise at that stage and the allegations against him would have to be proved in the court. On March 12, the manager held an enquiry, which was followed by dismissal on that very day. We shall mention later in detail what happened at the enquiry, as that is the main point which requires consideration in this appeal. To continue the narrative, however, the police submitted a final report" and the magistrate discharged Das on 23-3-1955. Thereafter his case was taken up by the union and eventually reference was made to the Tribunal on 8-3-1956. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the dismissal of Das was not justified on the ground of proper procedure not having been followed and also for want of legal evidence. It went on to say that normally Das would have been entitled to reinstatement but in the peculiar circumstances of this case it was of opinion that he should be granted the alternative relief for compensation. Consequently, it ordered that Das would be entitled to his pay and allowances from February 28 to March 11, 1955, and full pay and allowances from March 12 till the date of payment. It also ordered that he would be entitled to fifteen days pay for every completed year of service a along with all benefits that accrued to him till the date of final payment. This award was given on 23-10-1956, and was in due course published and came into force. Thereupon there was an application to this Court for special leave to appeal, which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.

2. Two points have been urged before us on behalf of the Company, namely-

(l) The Tribunal was not a competent tribunal under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) as it then stood; and

(2) the award of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law as it shows as if the Tribunal was sitting in appeal on the enquiry held by the company, and this it was not entitled to do.

Re. (1).

3. Reference in this case was made on 8-3-1956, before the Amending Act No. XXXVI of 1956 came into force. At the relevant time, therefore, S., 7 of the Act, which provided the qualifications of a tribunal, required that where it was one member tribunal, he (a) should be or should have been a Judge of a High Court, or (b) should be or should have been a district judge, or (c) should be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. The contention is that Shri Hazarika who was the tribunal in this case, was not qualified under this provision. This contention was not raised before the Tribunal a

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