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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
15th April, 1959.
B.P. SINHA, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.N. WANCHOO, JJ.
East Indian Coal Co. Ltd., Appellant
Versus
Parbati Sankar Mukherjee, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1957.
Advocate Appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General, for India (M/s. D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, Advocates, with him), for Appellant; M/s. D. L. Sen Gupta and Dipak Dutta Choudhry, Advocates, for Respondent.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - SECTION 33 - DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEE - PERMISSION OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL - SCOPE OF INQUIRY - INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) ACT, 1950 - SECTION 22 - APPEAL - SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW - STANDING ORDERS FOR THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY - CLAUSE 21 - NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.
Fact of the Case:
The respondent, a ration clerk employed by the appellant coal mining company, was accused of creating a scene and making false allegations against the office manager. The appellant sought permission from the Industrial Tribunal to dismiss or discharge the respondent under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent, in turn, applied under Section 33-A of the Act, alleging that his suspension for more than ten days without pay was a breach of Clause 27 of the Standing Orders and amounted to an alteration in his conditions of service without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal.
Finding of the Court:
The Industrial Tribunal granted permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent, holding that the discharge would be justified in the circumstances. However, the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the Industrial Tribunal's order, holding that the Industrial Tribunal had failed to consider the respondent's prayer for withdrawal of suspension and had not limited its inquiry to whether a prima facie case for discharge had been made out. The Labour Appellate Tribunal also refused the appellant's request for permission to discharge the respondent.
Issues: 1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal erred in granting permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent without considering the respondent's prayer for withdrawal of suspension? 2. Whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in setting aside the Industrial Tribunal's order granting permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent? 3. Whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in refusing the appellant's request for permission to discharge the respondent?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Industrial Tribunal did not err in granting permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent without considering the respondent's prayer for withdrawal of suspension, as the respondent's prayer was not a substantial question of law and the Industrial Tribunal had already granted permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent. 2. The Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in setting aside the Industrial Tribunal's order granting permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent, as the Industrial Tribunal had considered all relevant factors and had not exceeded its jurisdiction. 3. The Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in refusing the appellant's request for permission to discharge the respondent, as the appellant had made out a prima facie case for discharge and the Industrial Tribunal had already granted permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent.
Final Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and restored the order of the Industrial Tribunal granting permission to the appellant to discharge the respondent.
Judgement
K. N. WANCHOO J. : This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India in the matter of the discharge of an employee of the appellant. The appellant is a coal mining company carrying on business in the district of Manbhum (Bihar) and is governed by "Standing Orders for the Coal Mining Industry" as certified by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Appellate Authority) on 8-4-1950 under S. 6 (2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, XX of 1948. The respondent was a ration clerk in the employ of the appellant. The appellant s case is that the respondent went into the rice-godown on 7-4-1954 without any authority and created a scene by shourting in the presence of workmen and accusing the clerk in-charge of the rice-godown of deliberately giving short weight and also threatened that clerk. There was a complaint about this incident to the Colliery Superintendent, who sent for the respondent and made inquiries in the presence of the office manager. The respondent explained that he was joking. Thereupon the Colliery Superintendent pointed out to him the serious results which might have ensued from his action. The respondent then admitted his fault & apologized, and no further proceedings were consequently taken. On 24-4-1954, however, the respondent addressed a letter to the union, a copy of which was forwarded by it to the Colliery Superintendent. In that letter, according to the appellant, he made various false allegations against the Colliery Superintendent and the office manager. Thereupon the appellant decided to hold a thorough investigation into the matter and eventually a charge-sheet was delivered to the respondent on 3-5-1954 and he was asked to submit his explanation. The explanation was received on 5-5-1954 and an inquiry was held on May 6. Thereafter the respondent was suspended from May 7, pending completion of the inquiry. The inquiry-officer made his report on May 10. In the meantime, however, the respondent made certain allegations as to the manner in which the inquiry was made on May 6, and his complaint was that he had been forced to make a statement during the inquiry. So a further opportunity was given to him to say what he had to say and a further report was made on May 17. Thereafter the respondent was suspended from May 20, 1954, without pay. As a dispute was pending before the All India Industrial Tribunal at the time, the appellant applied under S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act) to the Tribunal for permission to dismiss the respondent in the interest of maintenance of discipline. The suspension from 20-5-1954, was pending permission of the Industrial Tribunal. The respondent in his turn made an application to the said Tribunal under S. 33-A of the Act that he had been dismissed from service on 20-5-1954, with effect from 7-5-1954, and that this was against S. 33 of the Act inasmuch as express permission in writing from the Industrial Tribunal had not been taken before such dismissal.
2. These were the two original applications under Ss. 33 and 33-A of the Act by the two parties. Later, both the parties prayed for amendment of their applications. The appellant prayed that in addition to the prayer for permission to dismiss the respondent, it might, in the alternative, be given permission to discharge the respondent. The respondent, on the other hand, prayed that his application u/s. 33-A might be amended by substituting suspension for dismissal , and his case by the amendment was that he had been suspended for more than ten days in breach of cl. 27 of the Standing Orders, and this amounted to an alteration in his conditions of service to his prejudice and could not be done without the express permission of the Industrial Tribunal under S. 33 of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal allowed the amendments prayed for by both the parties with their consent. Thus the prayer of the appellant finally was for permission either t
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