Rani Drigraj Kuer vs Raja Amar Krishna Narain Singh

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1959 Supreme(SC) 221

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
14th December, 1959.
S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.
Rani Drigraj Kuer Appellant
Versus
Raj Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh, Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 422 and 423 of 1958.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Niamatullah, Senior Advocate, (M/S. S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachani, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., for Mr. O. N. Srivastava, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; Mr. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, (M/s. Bishun Singh and C. P. Lal, Advocates, with him), for Respondent.

Advocates:
BISHAN SINGH, C.P.LAL, CO., H.N.SANYAL, J.B.DADACHAN, NIAMATULLAH, OMKAR NATH SRIVASTAV, RAJINDAR NARAIN, S.N.ANDLEY

Headnote:
COURT OF WARDS ACT - S. 56 - MANDATORY - FAILURE TO APPOINT REPRESENTATIVES - EFFECT - COMPROMISE DECREE - NULLITY - C. P. C., ORDER XXIII, RULE 3.
Fact of the Case:

The appellant and the respondent were wards of the Court of Wards and their estates were under the management of the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki. There was litigation between the two estates and at the crucial point of time, two appeals were pending on the file of the High Court at Allahabad. The cause-titles in the appeals gave the following array of parties: F. C. A. No. 99 of 1947 Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, I/C Court of Wards, Ganeshpur estate district Barabanki. Appellant versus Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, I/C Court of Wards, Ramnagar estate, district Barabanki. Respondent F. C. A. No. 2 of 1948 Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, I/C Court of Wards, Ramnagar estate, district Barabanki. Appellant versus Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, I/C Court of Wards, Ganeshpur estate, district Barabanki. Respondent It is clear from the said array of parties in the appeals that the same person represented both the estates, & the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, was both the appellant and respondent. It appears that the Court of Wards effected a settlement between the two wards in respect of the outstanding disputes between them, and presumably as directed by the Court of Wards, the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, filed a petition in the High Court for recording the compromise. The petition was signed by Sri K. A. P. Stevenson, I. A. S., Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, on behalf of both the estates. On 2-5-1952, the High Court passed a decree in terms of the said compromise.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that S. 56 of the U. P. Court of Wards Act, 1912 (hereinafter called the Act), imposes a statutory duty on the Court of Wards to appoint separate representatives when in a suit there are conflicting claims between two of its wards, and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with such a suit and make any order or decree on merits or on compromise unless such an appointment is made. In the present case, admittedly, no such appointment was made and the compromise petition was filed by the Deputy Commissioner, Barabanki, in his dual capacity as the appellant as well as the respondent, and therefore, the decree made therein was a nullity.
Issues: Whether the compromise decree was a nullity entitling the appellant to ignore it and to have the appeals disposed of on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the provisions of S. 56 of the Act are mandatory and therefore the word "shall" cannot be construed as "may" as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. The object of S. 56 of the Act is to prevent the anomaly of the same-person occupying a dual role of plaintiff and defendant and to provide for an effective machinery to safeguard the interest of the wards who are placed under the supervision of the Court of Wards. Should it be held that the appointment of a representative was at the discretion of the Court of Wards, the entire object of the section would be defeated. A person for whose benefit the provision was conceived would be represented by the opposite party, a situation anomalous in the extreme. On the other hand, no evil consequences can ordinarily be excepted to flow if the provision be construed as mandatory. A statutory body like the Court of Wards can be relied upon to discharge the duties cast upon it by S. 56 of the Act. Even if it fails, the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, will be heard on merits or a fresh compromise may be effected after following the prescribed procedure. The balance of convenience is on the side of the provision being construed as mandatory rather than as directory.
Final Decision: The Court held that the compromise decree was a nullity and the appeal must be deemed to be pending on the file of the High Court. The appellant will have his costs here and in the High Court.

Judgement Key Points

Based on the provided legal document, the conclusion is that the compromise decree in the case was deemed a nullity due to non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the relevant statute, specifically Section 56 of the Court of Wards Act. The failure to appoint separate representatives for the conflicting interests of the wards rendered the proceedings and the resulting decree invalid. Consequently, the appeals were considered to be still pending before the court, and the court was directed to dispose of the appeals in accordance with law. The order of the lower court was set aside, and the appeals were dismissed with costs.

Judgment

SARKAR, J. (on behalf of himself and S. K. Das J.) : Raja Udit Narain Singh was the proprietor of Ramnagar estate, a big taluqdari in district Barabanki in Uttar Pradesh, formerly known as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and for short U. P., an abbreviation still in use. Ramnagar estate was governed by the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), and in the absence of any disposition by the holder for the time being, it appears to have devolved according to the rule of primogeniture.

2. Raja Udit Narain died in 1927 leaving two sons of whom the elder was Raja Harnam and the younger Kanwar Sarnam. Kanwar Sarnam died in 1928 leaving the respondent his only son, and a widow, Parbati Kuer. Raja Harnam died thereafter in 1935 without issue, leaving the appellant his sole widow.

3. After the death of Raja Harnam disputes arose between the respondent, who was then a minor and was represented by his certificated guardian, his mother Parbati Kuer, and the appellant, a reference to which has now to be made.

4. The appellant s contentions appear to have been as follows : Raja Udit Narain left a will bequeathing certain villages of Ramnagar estate to Raja Harnam absolutely and the rest of it, as set out in a schedule to the will, to him for life and after him to Kanwar Sarnam for life and thereafter or failing the latter, to the respondent absolutely. The will declared that village Bichalka had been given to her for life as "runumai" or wedding present and that she would have a maintenance of Rs. 500 per month out of the estate. The schedule to the will did not mention five of the villages of Ramnagar estate with regard to which Raja Udit Narain died intestate and these thereupon devolved on Raja Harnam under the rule of primogeniture that applied to the estate. After Raja Udit Narain s death, Raja Harnam went into possession of the estate and executed a will leaving all the properties over which he had a power of disposition, including the seven villages bequeathed to him absolutely by Raja Udit Narain and the five villages not disposed of by his will, to her in absolute right. Thereafter Raja Harnam executed a deed of gift in her favour giving her most of the immovable properties covered by his will and several house properties in Lucknow.

5. On these allegations the appellant made a claim to all the properties said to have been given to her by the aforesaid wills and the gift of Raja Harnam. Parbati Kuer, on behalf of her son, the respondent, challenged the factum and validity of the wills and the gift said to have been made by Raja Harnam and resisted the appellant s claim. And so the disputes between the parties arose.

6. The Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki intervened to restore peace and brought about a family arrangement, into which the parties entered on 22-1-1935, settling the disputes on the terms therein contained. Under this family arrangement certain properties came to the appellant but it is not necessary for the purposes of these appeals to refer to them in detail.

7. The peace created by the family arrangement did not last long. The respondent after attaining majority on 12-9-1950, repudiated the family arrangement on grounds to which it is unnecessary to refer. On September 6, 1943, he filed a suit against the appellant to set aside the family arrangement and recover from her the properties of the estate in her possession. The defence of the appellant to the suit was that the family arrangement was binding on the respondent. However, to cover the eventuality of the family arrangement being found to be void or voidable, the appellant herself filed a suit against the respondent claiming title to various properties of the estate under the will of Raja Udit Narain and the will and gift of Raja Harnam. The respondent contested this suit. With the particulars of the claims and defences in the suits or their soundness we are not concerned in these appeals, and a reference to them will not be necessary.

8. While these two suits were

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