SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
11th February, 1960.
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.
The Associated Cement Co. Ltd., Appellant
Versus
P. D. Vyas and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1958.
Advocates appeared
Mr. R. J. Kolah, Advocate and M/s. S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain & Co., for Appellant; M/s. Gopal Singh and R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, for Respondent No. 2.
INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT (STANDING ORDERS) ACT, 1946 - SECTIONS 3, 4, 5, 15 - STANDING ORDERS - MODIFICATION BY CERTIFYING OFFICER - JURISDICTION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellants, Associated Cement Companies Ltd., submitted draft standing orders for certification under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, as the certifying officer, made modifications to the draft, including increasing the notice period for discontinuance of a shift from 14 days to one month and modifying the provisions relating to strikes and inciting strikes. The appellants challenged the modifications, arguing that the certifying officer had exceeded his jurisdiction.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that the certifying officer had jurisdiction to make the modifications. The Court interpreted Section 3(2) of the Act as requiring the draft standing orders to conform to the model standing orders prescribed by the appropriate government, unless it was impracticable to do so. The Court also held that the certifying officer's enquiry into the practicability of conformity with the model standing orders did not involve an impermissible adjudication of the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the draft standing orders.
Issues: Whether the certifying officer had jurisdiction to modify the draft standing orders submitted by the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the certifying officer had jurisdiction to modify the draft standing orders because: * Section 3(2) of the Act required the draft standing orders to conform to the model standing orders prescribed by the appropriate government, unless it was impracticable to do so. * The certifying officer's enquiry into the practicability of conformity with the model standing orders did not involve an impermissible adjudication of the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the draft standing orders.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Dwarka Cement Works, Dwarka and the Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Sevalia Cement Works, Sevalia (hereinafter called the appellants) own and manage several cement works throughout India including inter alia cement manufacturing factories at Dwarka and Sevalia called the Dwarka Cement Works and the Sevalia Cement Works respectively. In 1946 the appellants submitted to respondent 2, the Commissioner of Labour, Bombay, in his capacity as certifying officer, draft standing orders for certification under S. 3(1) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946) (hereinafter called the Act). Respondent 2 made several alterations in the draft submitted by the appellants. The two important alterations which are the subject-matter of the present appeal were in respect of items Nos. 8 and 16. Under item No. 8 the draft standing orders had required that notice of fourteen days shall be given in the event of discontinuance of a shift. Respondent 2 has modified it by increasing the period of notice from fourteen days to one month. This modification has been made in accordance with the model standing order on this subject. Similarly, item No. 16 (2) in the draft standing orders provided that striking work either singly or with other workers without giving fourteen days previous notice would be treated as misconduct; whereas item No. 16 (3) provided that inciting while on the premises any worker to strike work shall be treated as misconduct. These two provisions in the draft have been modified by respondent 2 and the order thus modified provides that striking work illegally either singly or with other workers or abetting, inciting, instigating or acting in furtherance of an illegal strike would be treated as misconduct. This modification also is consistent with the relevant provision in the model standing order.
2. Feeling aggrieved by the modifications made by respondent 2 in the draft submitted by them the appellants preferred an appeal to the Industrial court (hereinafter called respondent 1). Respondent 1 was not impressed by the contentions raised by the appellants with the result that the modifications made by respondent 2 were confirmed and the appeal was dismissed.
3. Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition, being Miscellaneous Application No. 267 of 1954, in the Bombay High Court challenging the validity of the action of respondents 2 and 1. Mr. Justice Coyajee, who heard the said application, upheld the contention raised by the appellants and came to the conclusion that in making the impugned modifications respondent 2 and respondent 1 had acted beyond their jurisdiction. The learned judge, therefore, set aside the modifications made and allowed the appellants petition.
4. Against this order respondent 2 preferred an appeal, being Appeal No. 122 of 1954, before the Court of Appeal in the Bombay High Court. The appellate court reversed the decision of Coyajee J. and held that the action of respondents 2 and 1 in making the modifications in question was justified by the provisions of the Act. In the result the petition filed by the appellants was dismissed. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants; and the short question which it raises for our decision is: whether, under the provisions of the Act, it was competent to respondents 2 and I to make the impugned modifications in the draft standing orders submitted by the appellants for certification under the Act?
5. The Act has been passed because it was thought "expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them." Standing Orders are defined by S. 2 (g) of the Act to mean rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule. The Schedule sets out 11 matters in respect of which standing orders are re
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