A lock out is not a lay off, and therefore, the provisions applicable to the payment of lay off compensation cannot be applied to the cases of lock out.

Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.: This appeal by special leave is directed against the order passed by the Labour Court at Coimbatore directing the appellant, the Management of the Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri, to pay lay off compensation to its workmen, the respondents, for the period between July 28, 1957, to September 2, 1957. This order was passed on a complaint filed by the respondents before the Labour court under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act).

2. The material facts leading to the respondents complaint must be set out briefly at the outset. On July 26, 1957, Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer, the appellant s Manager, was assaulted by some of the workmen of the appellant. He suffered six fractures and had to be in hospital in Coonoor and Madras for over a month. The appellants staff working in the division known as kelso Division was also threatened by the workmen. As a result of these threats three members of the staff wrote to the appellants on July 27, 1957, that they were afraid to go down to the lower division and it was impossible for them to work there because their lives were in danger. They added that the workers in the lower division were threatening them that they would murder them if they worked in the lower division. On receiving this communication from its staff the appellant notified on the same day that the Kelso Division would be closed from that day onwards until further notice. This notice referred to the brutal assault on the Manager and to the threat held out against the field staff who were reluctant to face the risk of working in the lower division. It appears that the Kelso Division continued to be closed until September 2, 1957, on which date it was opened, as a result of conciliation before the labour officer, when the respondents gave an assurance that there would not be any further trouble. The claim for lay off is made for the said period during which the division remained closed between July 28 to September 2, 1957.

3. Soon after the division was closed the respondents made a complaint to the Labour Court (No. 43 of 1957) under S. 33A of the Act in which they alleged that they had been stopped from doing their work without notice or enquiry and claimed an order or reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service. At the hearing of the said complaint the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the closure in question was a lock out and that it did not amount either to an alteration of conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen nor did it constitute discharge or punishment by dismissal or otherwise under cls. A and B of S. 33 respectively, and so the petition was incompetent. This preliminary objection was upheld by the Labour Court and the complaint was accordingly dismissed on November 30, 1957.

4. Thereafter the present complaint was filed by the respondents on January 31, 1958, under S. 33C of the Act. In this complaint it was stated that the respondents were refused work from July 28 to September 2, 1957, "by declaring a lock out of a division of the estate" and the claim made was that, as the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the division during the said days and laid off the respondents, the respondents were entitled to claim lay off compensation under S. 25C of the Act. Against this complaint the appellant raised several contentions. It was urged on its behalf that the complaint was incompetent under S. 33C and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to deal with it. It was also contended that the closure of the division amounted to a lock out which under the circumstances was perfectly justified and as such the respondents were not entitled to claim any lay off compensation. The Labour Court rejected the preliminary objection as to want of jurisdiction and held that the complaint was competent under S. 33C. On the merits it found in favour of the respondents and so it directed the appellant to pay to the respo