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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
21st April, 1960.
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO AND K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.
Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah, Appellant
Versus
Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb and others, Respondents.
Civil appeal No. 81 of 1956.
Advocates Appeared
Mr. L. K. Jha, Senior Advocate, (M/s. B. K. Saran, S. T. Hussain, S. K. Jha and K. L. Mehta, Advocates, with him), for Appellant; Mr. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, (M/s. J. C. Das Gupta and R. C. Prasad, Advocates, with him), for Respondent No. 1.
LIMITATION ACT - S. 19 - Acknowledgment by Receiver of Estate - Whether acknowledgment by agent duly authorised in this behalf - Explanation II to S. 19 - Interpretation.
Fact of the Case:
Suit for rent and royalties on the basis of a lease granted by the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. The appellant raised two defences: (1) that the lessor had dispossessed him from part of the leasehold property and so there ought to be total suspension of rents and royalties; and (2) that the claim for the period prior to August 12, 1935, was barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge held that the plea of suspension of rent must fail as the only case of dispossession from leasehold property was made in respect of minerals which had been specifically excluded from the earlier lease of 1900. He also negatived the plea of limitation, being of opinion that the Official Receiver was competent to make such acknowledgments and that in fact there were acknowledgments of the plaintiff's liability within the meaning of S.19 of the Limitation Act. On appeal, the High Court agreed with the conclusions of the Trial Judge. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that the minerals mentioned in cl. 16 of the principal lease were not granted by the later lease also. The plea of suspension of rents based as it is one the allegation that the metals and minerals mentioned in cl. 16 of the principal lease were covered by the later lease must therefore fail. The acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of S. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August 12, 1953. The Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendant's plea of limitation.
Issues: 1. Whether the minerals specifically excluded in cl. 16 of the earlier lease were demised to the lessee by the later lease of 1919? 2. Whether any portion of the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The intention of the parties to a document of grant must be ascertained first and foremost from the words used in the disposition clause, understanding the words used in their strict, natural grammatical sense and that once the intention can be clearly understood from the words in the disposition clause this interpreted it is no business of the courts to examine what the parties may have said in other portions of the document. 2. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. 3. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. 4. The preamble of the document can be referred to in order to ascertain the intention of the parties. 5. Explanation II to S. 19 of the Limitation Act in saying "for the purposes of this section signed means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf" has not limited in any way the manner in which the authority can be given. 6. The view taken in this matter by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Annapagonda v. Sangadiappa, ILR 26 Bom 221, that "duly authorised" would include duly authorised either by the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order of the Court has been followed in other High Courts also and in our opinion represents the correct state of law.
Final Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Judgment
DAS GUPTA, J.: Dhalbhum estate which covers an area of more than 1,000 sq. miles and lies partly in the District of Midnapur and partly in the District of Singhbhum is rich in minerals. In 1900 the then Proprietor of this estate Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo granted permanent lease of the mining rights for certain metals and minerals in this estate to Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah of Tollygunge in the District of 24-Parganas. Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo died in 1916. Before his death however the management of the estate had been taken over by the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur Encumbered Estates Act. In the course of such management the Manager of the Estate granted on September 1, 1919, to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area. The present litigation was commenced by the first respondent with a view to recover rent and royalties on the basis of the second lease from the heirs and representatives of the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also from the present appellant as Receiver to that estate. As under the terms of the lease the lessor is entitled to the half share of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from January 1, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts. As the suit was brought on August 12, 1941, the period prior to August 12, 1935, would prima facie be barred by limitation. According to the plaintiff limitation was saved by the acknowledgments that had been made from time to time by the then Receiver of the estate. Two defence were raised by the Receiver who was the only contesting defendant. The first was that the lessor had dispossessed him from part of the leasehold property and so there ought to be total suspension of rents and royalties. The second defence was as regards the claim for the period prior to August 12, 1935. It was pleaded that the letters which are claimed to have acknowledged the liability did not in law amount to acknowledgment of liability and that in any case the alleged acknowledgments being by the Receiver who was an agent of the court and not an agent of the parties the acknowledgments would be of no avail in saving limitation.
2. Though the written-statement itself did not in terms mention the nature of the lessee s dispossession from the leasehold property the definite case at the trial was that this dispossession was in respect of minerals which had been specifically excluded from the earlier lease of 1900 but according to the defendant included in the later lease. One of the main questions in the appeal is whether the minerals specifically excluded in cl. 16 of the earlier lease were demised to the lessee by the later lease of 1919. Of the several issues that have been framed we are therefore concerned now only with the two issues in respect of these two defences. The first of these is : "Is the defendant entitled to suspension of rents and royalties as claimed"; the second is : "Is any portion of the plaintiff s claim barred by limitation?" The Subordinate Judge held on a construction of the lease of 1919 that it did not include minerals specifically excluded by cl. 16 of the earlier lease and as the only case of dispossession from leasehold property was made in respect of these minerals the plea of suspension of rent must fail. He also negatived the plea of limitation, being of opinion that the Official Receiver was competent to make such acknowledgments and that in fact there were acknowledgments of the plaintiff s liability within the meaning of S.19 of the Limitation Act. With regard to the period from 1935 to 1941, regarding which no question of limitation arose th
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