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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
6th March, 1961
S.K. DAS, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH, AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.
Jagannath Prasad Sharma, Appellant
Versus
The State of U.P. and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 490 of 1957.
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate (M/s. S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., with him), for Appellant; Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate (M/s. G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, Advocates, with him), for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3.
POLICE ACT - S. 7 - U. P. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1947 - R. 4, 10 - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ART. 14, 311 - Police officer - Dismissal from service - Enquiry - Procedure - Equal protection of laws - Discrimination - Reasonable opportunity - Interpretation of statutes.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a police officer, was dismissed from service after an enquiry held by a Tribunal appointed under the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947. He challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the order was unauthorised, that the enquiry was void as it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and that the proceedings were vitiated by patent irregularities.
Finding of the Court:
1. The Governor had the power to dismiss the appellant from service under S. 7 of the Police Act and the Tribunal Rules framed thereunder. 2. The enquiry held by the Tribunal against the appellant and the order consequent upon that enquiry did not deprive the appellant of the equal protection of the laws and were therefore not void as infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution. 3. The procedure provided in the Police Regulations and the Tribunal Rules for enquiries against police officers was substantially the same, and by continuing the enquiry after the Constitution under the Tribunal Rules and not under the Police Regulations, a more onerous procedure prejudicial to the appellant was not adopted. 4. The appellant was entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, which includes the right to a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, to defend himself by cross-examining witnesses and examining himself and other witnesses in support of his defence, and to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him. 5. The Tribunal Rules provided for all these opportunities, and therefore the enquiry held by the Tribunal was not vitiated by any violation of Art. 311(2). 6. The absence of the right of appeal under R. 10 of the Tribunal Rules while a right of appeal is given to a police officer under the Police Regulations, results in unequal treatment in a substantial matter, as between a police officer proceeded against under the Tribunal Rules and an officer who is proceeded against under the Police Regulations procedure.
Issues: 1. Whether the Governor had the power to dismiss the appellant from service. 2. Whether the enquiry held by the Tribunal against the appellant and the order consequent upon that enquiry deprived the appellant of the equal protection of the laws. 3. Whether the procedure provided in the Police Regulations and the Tribunal Rules for enquiries against police officers was substantially the same. 4. Whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. 5. Whether the Tribunal Rules provided for all the opportunities guaranteed by Art. 311(2). 6. Whether the absence of the right of appeal under R. 10 of the Tribunal Rules while a right of appeal is given to a police officer under the Police Regulations, results in unequal treatment.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Governor had the power to dismiss the appellant from service under S. 7 of the Police Act and the Tribunal Rules framed thereunder, as the authority vested in the Inspector-General of Police and his subordinates by S. 7 of the Police Act was not exclusive. 2. The enquiry held by the Tribunal against the appellant and the order consequent upon that enquiry did not deprive the appellant of the equal protection of the laws and were therefore not void as infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution, as the procedure provided in the Police Regulations and the Tribunal Rules for enquiries against police officers was substantially the same, and by continuing the enquiry after the Constitution under the Tribunal Rules and not under the Police Regulations, a more onerous procedure prejudicial to the appellant was not adopted. 3. The appellant was entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, which includes the right to a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, to defend himself by cross-examining witnesses and examining himself and other witnesses in support of his defence, and to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him. 4. The Tribunal Rules provided for all these opportunities, and therefore the enquiry held by the Tribunal was not vitiated by any violation of Art. 311(2). 5. The absence of the right of appeal under R. 10 of the Tribunal Rules while a right of appeal is given to a police officer under the Police Regulations, results in unequal treatment in a substantial matter, as between a police officer proceeded against under the Tribunal Rules and an officer who is proceeded against under the Police Regulations procedure.
Final Decision: Appeal dismissed.
Judgment
SHAH, J. : (along with S. K. Das, Hidayatullah, and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.) - In 1931, the appellant was admitted to the police force of the United Provinces and was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police. He was later promoted to the rank of Inspector, and in 1946 was transferred to the Anticorruption department. In 1947, he was appointed, while retaining his substantive rank of Inspector, to officiating rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Shortly thereafter, complaints were received by the Chief Minister and Inspector-General of Police, U. P., charging the appellant with immortality, corruption and gross dereliction of duty. In a preliminary confidential enquiry, the Inspector-General of Police came to the conclusion that "a prima facie case" was made out against the appellant. He then directed that a formal enquiry be held against the appellant to his substantive rank of Inspector and placing him under suspension. An enquiry was held into the conduct of the appellant by the Superintendent of Police, Anti-corruption department. The report of the Superintendent of Police was forwarded to the Government of U. P., and the Governor acting under R. 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules 1947 - hereinafter called the Tribunal Rules - referred the case for enquiry to a Tribunal appointed under R. 3 of the Tribunal Rules on charges of corruption, personal immorality and failure to discharge duties properly. The Tribunal framed three charges against the appellant and after a detailed survey of the evidence recommended on February 4, 1950, that the appellant be dismissed from service. The Governor then served a notice requiring the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and after considering the explanation submitted by the appellant, the Governor ordered that the appellant be dismissed with effect from December 5, 1950. The appellant challenged his order by a petition instituted in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the proceedings of the Tribunal and for a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttar Pradesh to hold an enquiry under S. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.
2. In support of his appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing his petition, the appellant has raised three contentions :
1. that the order dismissing the appellant from the police force was unauthorised, because the Governor had no power under S. 7 of the Police Act and the regulations framed thereunder to pass that order ;
2. that even if the Governor was invested with power to dismiss a police officer, out of two alternative modes of enquiry, a mode prejudicial to the appellant having been adopted, the proceedings of the Tribunal which enquired into the charges against him were void, as the equal protection clause of the constitution was violated; and
3. that the proceedings of the Tribunal were vitiated because of patent irregularities which resulted in an erroneous decision as to the guilt of the appellant.
3. To appreciate the first two contentions, it is necessary briefly to set out the relevant provisions of the laws procedural and substantive in force, having a bearing on the tenure of service of members of the police force in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
4. The appellant was admitted to the police force constituted under Act V of 1861. By S. 3 of that Act, superintendence throughout a general police directed vests in and is exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate and except as authorised by the Act, no person, officer or court may be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary. By S. 4, the administration of the police throughout a general police-district is vested in the Inspector-General of Police. By S. 7, it is provided that subject to the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and to s
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