In Goda Dattak adoption, there is no inherent bar to adopting the wife's sister's husband, no established custom barring the adoption of members from other Vallabhacharya families, and no implied prohibition against adopting anyone other than the plaintiff or his sons was established. The consent of the husband's sapindas is not required if the husband had authorized the adoption.

Judgment

DAS GUPTA, J. : The appellant and the second respondent are both descendants of Vallabhacharyaji, a great Vaishnava teacher who flourished more than 400 years ago. Vallabhacharyaji left his native place near Champaranya in South India, and coming to Gujrat and other parts of India established shrines for the worship of Vishnu at several places. His descendants became the priests and Shebaits of such shrines and also of other shrines established thereafter. These came to be known as Gadis. While each of these Gadis had a temple for the worship of Vishnu, considerable properties, movable and immovable were acquired for them from time to time by gift or otherwise. One such shrine was established more than 100 years ago at Nadiad and about the year 1899 A.D. a descendant of Vallabhacharyaji who on adoption took the name of Anniruddhalalji Murlidharji became the head of the Nadiad shrine and was thus possessed of the movable and immovable properties appertaining to the Gadi. This gentleman also became by adoption head of another shrine known as the Moti Haveli at Jamnagar in the year 1913 and then took a slightly different name Anniruddhalalji Brijeshji. Both these adoptions were in accordance with the Goda Dattak custom of adaption which prevailed among the members of the Vallabhacharya community. Anniruddhalalji, Murlidharji (alias Anirudhalalji Brijeshji) died on December 17, 1935 leaving a widow Mahalakshmi Bahuji Maharaj, who is the first respondent before us.

2. The question of adopting an heir to him assumed importance immediately on his death and it appears there was some talk of adopting by the Goda Dattak custom one of the sons of the present appellant, who it is necessary to mention, was the natural brother of Anniruddhalalji. The talks however proved fruitless and ultimately on June 1, 1946, the second respondent who as already stated was also a descendant of Vallabhacharya was adopted. The present suit was brought by the appellant in respect of the Haveli and other properties left by Anniruddhalalji at Nadiad. In this he challenges the validity of the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent, Mahalakshmi Bahuji Maharaj.

3. The main prayer in the suit is for a declaration that respondent No. 2 was not the legally adopted son of Aniruddhalalji and did not acquire any right or shares in his property by the alleged adoption. The other prayers included one for a declaration that he the appellant was the nearest heir of the deceased, that the first respondent had no other right in the property except as a Hindu widow, for an injunction restraining her from frittering away the property or any part thereof, for an order on her to produce the balance of the sale proceeds of Maharaja s Bag which she had sold off and for an order on both these respondents to render accounts of the properties of Goswami Anniruddhalalji which might have come into their hands.

4. It is no longer in dispute that the plaintiff would be the nearest heir on the death of the widow if there has been no valid adoption of the second respondent to Aniruddhalalji. The appellant challenged the validity of the adoption on three main grounds. The first was that under the custom of the. Vallabhacharya community under which Goda Dattak adoption is made the adoptee (using that word to denote the boy taken in adoption) must be only from the family of the adoptive father if this be possible and in the present case even though the plaintiff himself as well as his two sons were available for adoption the second respondent was adopted in preference to them. The second ground was that under the Goda Dattak custom the wife s sister s husband cannot be validly adopted. The third ground was that Aniruddhalaji had expressed his desire in this matter of adoption in such a manner that there was an implied prohibition by him from taking in adoption anybody except the present appellant or one of his sons.

5. The first two grounds were raised in Issue No.8 of