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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA. J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL. JJ.
Manohar Lal Chopra, Appellant
Versus
Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 846 of 1958. 528
16th November, 1961.
Advocates appeared
M/s. S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, Advocates of M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., for Appellant; Mr. S. T. Desai, Senior Advocate, (M/s. K. P. Bhatt and B.R. L. Iyengar, Advocates, with him for Respondent. 530
-provisions of this section are mandatory and, therefore, once the conditions for its applicability are present, the Court has no option but to stay the suit
-where the provisions of Section 10 do not apply, order of stay of suit under Section 151 is not justified
-the provisions of this section will not become inapplicable on a court holding that the previously instituted suit is vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract
-such an order is not to be made unless absolutely essential for the ends of justice - Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Singh Seth Hira Lal, AIR 1962 SC 527. It was observed in this case that the mere fact that the Court is situated at a long distance from the place of residence of the respondent is not sufficient to establish that the suit has been filed in that court in order to put the respondent to trouble and harassment and to unnecessary expenses.
-the provisions of this section are clear, definite and mandatory. A court in which a subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit in certain specified circumstances when there is a special provision in the Code for dealing with the contingencies of two suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers under Section 151 is not justified
-there is no such expression in this Section which expressly prohibits the issue of temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression “if it is so prescribed” is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the excercise of its inherent jurisdiction. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power
-as observed in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it.
-The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances, for which the Code lays down no procedure - Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527. The Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them.
-Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 of the Code if the interests of justice require
-if a case is not covered by this Rule for amendment of the plaint resort cannot be had to Section 151 of the Code. The party has to satisfy the requirements of this rule before he could be allowed to make the amendment in the plaint - Manohar Lal Chopra v. Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527; Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993; Radhavallabh v. Bhagwandas Dwarkadas, AIR 1965 SC 1144 = (1965) 2 SCR 186.
-it is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression “if so prescribed” in Section 94 of the Code is only this that when the Rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunction, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court’s exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power
-there is nothing in Rules 1 and 2, which provide specifically that a temporary injunction is not to be issued in cases which are not mentioned in those rules. The rules mentioned in them the Court may grant temporary injunction
-the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding stay of suits and injunctions are clear, definite, and mandatory when the conditions for their applicability are met. Once the criteria are satisfied, the court has no discretion but to stay the suit (!) .
The exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code is meant for exceptional cases where the Code does not lay down specific procedures. Such powers should be exercised with great caution and only when absolutely necessary to do justice between the parties (!) (!) .
The inherent powers are not intended to control or limit the provisions of the Code but are supplementary, meant to be used to prevent abuse of process or to achieve justice in circumstances not expressly covered by the Code (!) (!) (!) .
The scope of inherent powers includes issuing temporary injunctions in circumstances not specifically provided for in the rules, but such powers should be exercised only in exceptional cases, and not as a routine substitute for specific procedural provisions (!) (!) (!) .
Orders restraining a party from proceeding with a suit in another court must be made with great care and only when absolutely necessary for justice. Such orders should not be issued lightly, especially when the suit is properly instituted in a competent court (!) (!) .
The legislative intent appears to favor adherence to the specific provisions of the Code, with inherent powers acting as a complement rather than a substitute. When the Code provides a specific procedure, that procedure should be followed (!) (!) .
The exercise of inherent jurisdiction to restrain proceedings should be based on substantial grounds, such as abuse of process or vexatious conduct, rather than mere inconvenience or distance between courts (!) (!) .
The courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions only in circumstances that are not explicitly covered by the procedural rules, and such powers should be exercised with caution and only when necessary to prevent injustice or abuse (!) (!) .
The provisions of the Code are not exhaustive; however, when specific provisions exist, they must be observed, and the inherent powers should not be used to circumvent these provisions (!) (!) .
Orders that interfere with the proceedings of a suit in another court should be issued only when justified by exceptional circumstances, and not merely to prevent a party from exercising their legal rights in a proper forum (!) (!) .
Would you like a summary or further clarification on any specific point?
Judgment
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. : (on behalf of himself and Wanchoo and Das Gupta JJ.) The appellant and the respondent entered into a partnership at Indore for working coal mines at Kajoragram (District Burdwan) and manufacture of cement etc., in the name and style of Diamond Industries . The head office of the partnership was at Indore. The partnership was dissolved by a deed of dissolution dated August 22, 1945. Under the terms of this deed, the appellant made himself liable to render full, correct and true account of all the moneys advanced by the respondent and also to render accounts of the said partnership and its business, and was held entitled to 1/4th of Rs. 4,00,000 solely contributed by the respondent towards the capital of the partnership. He was, however, not entitled to get this amount unless and until he had rendered the accounts and they had been checked and audited.
2. The second proviso at the end of the covenants in the deed of dissolution reads :
"Provided however and it is agreed by and between the parties that as the parties entered into the partnership agreement at Indore (Holkar State) all disputes and differences whether regarding money or as to the relationship or as to their rights and liabilities of the parties hereto in respect of the partnership hereby dissolved or in respect of questions arising by and under this document shall be decided amicably or in court at Indore and at nowhere else."
3. On September 29, 1945, a registered letter on behalf of the respondent was sent to the appellant. This required the appellant to explain to and satisfy the respondent at Indore as to the accounts of the said colliery within three months of the receipt of the notice. It was said in the notice that the accounts submitted by the appellant had not been properly kept and that many entries appeared to be wilfully falsified, evidently with mala fide intentions and that there appeared in the account books various false and fictitious entries causing wrongful loss to the respondent and wrongful gain to the appellant. The appellant sent a reply to this notice on December 5, 1945, and denied the various allegations, and requested the respondent to meet him at Asansol or Kajoragram on any day suitable to him, within ten days from the receipt of that letter.
4. On August 18, 1948, the appellant instituted Suit M. S. No. 39 of 1948 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Asansol against the respondent for the recovery at Rs. 1,00,000 on account of his share in the capital and assets of the partnership firm Diamond Industries and Rs. 18,000 as interest for detention of the money or as damages or compensation for wrongful withholding of the payment, in the plaint he mentioned about the respondent s notice and his reply and to a second letter on behalf of the respondent and his own reply thereto. A copy of the deed of dissolution, according to the statement in paragraph 13 of the plaint, was filed along with it.
5. On October 27, 1948, the respondent filed a petition under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act in the Asansol Court praying for the stay of the suit in view of the arbitration agreement in the original deed of partnership. This application was rejected on August 20, 1949.
6. Meanwhile, on January 3, 1949, the respondent filed Civil Original Suit No. 71 of 1949 in the Court of the District Judge, Indore, against the appellant, and prayed for a decree for Rs. 1,90,519-0-6 against the appellant and further interest on the footing of settled accounts and in the alternative for a direction to the appellant to render true and full accounts of the partnership.
7. On November 28, 1949, the respondent filed his written statement in the Asansol Court. Paragraphs 19 and 21 of the written statement are :
"19. With reference to paragraph 21 of the plaint, the defendant denies that the plaintiff has any cause of action against the defendant or that the alleged cause of action, the existence of which is denied, arose at Kajora Colliery. The d
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