Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1962 Supreme(SC) 337

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.K. DAS, K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.
T. V. V. Narasimham and others, Appellants
Versus
State of Orissa, Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 147 to 157 of 1962.
Advocates appeared
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate, (Mr. M. S. K Sastri, Advocate, with him), for Appellants; Mr. H. N. Sanyal, Additional, Solicitor General of India (M/s. J. C. Naik, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N. Sachthey, Advocates, with him), for Respondents.

Advocates:
A.V.VISHWANATHA SASTRI, B.R.G.K.Achar, H.N.SANYAL, J.C.NAIK, M.S.K.Shastri, R.N.SACH

Mere inaction or acquiescence on the part of the Government does not amount to "recognition" within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Recognition requires an overt act on the part of the Government, such as an express acknowledgment or unequivocal act.

Headnote:
ESTATES LAND ACT - S. 3(2)(D) - INTERPRETATION - "RECOGNISED" - MEANING - INACTION OR ACQUIESCENCE - WHETHER AMOUNTS TO RECOGNITION.
Fact of the Case:

The dispute arose from the interpretation of the term "recognised" in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act (1 of 1908) (Madras Act). The appellants, inamadars of certain villages, challenged the notifications issued by the Government of Orissa declaring the villages as "estates" and liable to be abolished under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952 (Orissa Act). The appellants claimed that the villages were pre-settlement inams excluded from the permanent settlement and were not "estates" within the meaning of the Madras Act. The State contended that the villages were included in the assets of the zamindari or paragana at the time of their respective settlements and were therefore "estates" liable to be abolished.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that "recognition" signifies an admission or acknowledgment of something existing before and implies an overt act on the part of the person taking such cognizance. Acquiescence in the context of certain surrounding circumstances may amount to recognition, but it must be such as to lead to that inevitable conclusion. Mere inaction de hors such compelling circumstances cannot amount to recognition within the meaning of the section.
Issues: 1. Whether inaction or acquiescence on the part of the Government amounts to "recognition" within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908? 2. Whether the villages in question were "estates" within the meaning of the Madras Act or the Orissa Act?
Ratio Decidendi: The Court interpreted the term "recognised" in Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Act to mean an admission or acknowledgment of something existing before, requiring an overt act on the part of the Government. Mere inaction or acquiescence, without compelling circumstances leading to the inevitable conclusion of recognition, does not suffice. In the present case, the Court found that the Government's decision not to take further action in connection with the settlement of pre-settlement inams in the Jeypore zamindari amounted to recognition of the inamdars' titles under the zamindar. However, the Court held that there was no evidence of recognition by the Government in respect of the other villages.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals related to the villages within the Jeypore zamindari, holding that the Government had recognized the inams within the meaning of the Madras Act. However, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the remaining appeals for disposal on other questions of fact and law, as the High Court had not given definite findings on disputed questions of fact.

Judgment

SUBBA RAO, J. : These appeals raise the same point, namely, the true interpretation of the expression "recognised" in S. 3(2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act (1 of 1908), hereinafter called the Madras Act, and they can be disposed of together.

2. The facts giving rise to the said appeals may be briefly stated. The Government of Orissa treating the villages, which are the subject- matter of these appeals, as "estates" issued notifications declaring that the said estates became vested in the State free from all encumbrances from the dates specified therein. The inamadars of the respective villages filed petitions in the High Court of Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ for canceling the said notifications and for orders prohibiting the State from taking possession of the said villages.

3. The said villages can be placed in three groups, namely (i) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 150, 151 and 155 which are admittedly within the geographical limits of Jeypore Zamindari which was settled in the year 1603; (ii) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 149, 154 and 157 which are within the geographical limits of Kotpad Paragana as settled in 1863, but the terms whereof were subsequently modified in 1901 - the Kotpad Paragana, though it had separate existence at the time of the permanent settlement of the Jeypore Zamindari in 1803, had become part of the said Zamindari by subsequent events, the details whereof do not concern us at this stage; (iii) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 147, 148, 152, 153 and 156 of 1962 in regard to which there is a dispute whether these villages formed part of Kotpad Paragana or of the Jeypore Zamindari as originally settled in 1803.

4. The case of the appellants is that the said villages, which formed part of the original Jeypore Zamindari are pre-settlement inams which were excluded from the permanent settlement; and, as they were neither confirmed nor recognized by the British Government, they were not estates within the meaning of S. 3(2 (d) of the Madras Act and therefore not liable to be abolished, under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, hereinafter called the Orissa Act. Their contention in regard to the villages forming part of Kotpad Paragana is the same, namely, that the villages forming part of the said Paragana were grant made before the said Paragana was permanently settled in 1863 and, as they were not confirmed or recognized by the British Government, they were also not "estates" within the meaning of the said section. The State pleaded that the said villages whether they formed part of the orginal Jeypore Zamindari or of Kotpad Paragana, were included in the assets of the said Zamindari or the Paragana at the time of their respective settlements and, therefore, they were estates within the meaning of either S. 3(2)(a) or 3(2) (e) of the Madras Act and were rightly abolished by the State. They further contended that the third group of villages formed part of the original Jeypore Zamindari, and that even if the said villages formed part of Kotpad Paragana it would not make any difference in the legal position, as the permanent settlement of that Paragana was not made under Regulation XXV of 1802, and as such no land was excluded from its assets at the time of the settlement. To put it differently their case is that in the settlement of Kotpad Paragana, the said villages were included in its assets.

5. The High Court did not give its decision on disputed facts but assumed the correctness of the appellants case, namely, that the first group of villages were pre-settlement inams within the geographical limits of Jeypore Zamindari, as originally settled in 1803, and that the second and third groups of villages were presettlement inams situated in Kotpad Paragana as settled in 1863, and held that, as the said villages were recognised by the British Government within the meaning of S. 3(2) (d) of the Madras Act, they were "estates" liable to be

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