SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.J. IMAM, K SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
K M. Shanmugam, Proprietor, K M. S. Transport Tanjore, Madras State, Appellant
Versus
The S. R. V. S. (P) Ltd., and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 697 of 1962.
Advocates appeared
Mr. B. Sen Senior Advocate (M/s. Ravinder Narain, O.C. Mathur and J.B. Dadachanji, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co. with him), for Appellant; Mr A.V. Viswanatha Sastri Senior Advocate (Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan, Advocate, with him) for Respondent No. 1; Mr. A Rangandham Chetty, Senior Advocate (Mr. A.V. Rangam, Advocate, with him), for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - S. 47 - S. 43A - DIRECTIONS ISSUED UNDER S. 43A - NATURE OF - ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD - SCOPE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI - JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT UNDER ART. 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant and the first respondent were applicants for a stage carriage permit for the route Tanjore-Mannargudi via Vaduvoor. The Regional Transport Authority, adopting the marking system prescribed in G. O. Ms. No. 1298 (Home) dated April 28, 1956, awarded marks to different applicants: the appellant got the highest number of marks, viz., 7, and the first respondent got only 44 marks, with the result the appellant was preferred to the respondent & a permit was issued to him. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent preferred an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter called the Appellate Tribunal. The said Appellate Tribunal recast the marks in respect of the said two parties in the following manner: Viable Unit cum Workshop Residence Experience Special Cir- TOTAL Appellant 4 2 1 3/4 1/4 8 Respondent - 2 - 1 1 4 It would be seen from the marks given by the Appellate Tribunal that the total of the marks secured by the appellant under Cols. 2 to 5 is equal to that secured by the first respondent under the said columns, each of them securing 4 marks. It was contended before the Appellate Tribunal that the first respondent was entitled to some mark under the column "Residence or place of business" on the ground that it had the places of business at Tanjore and Mannargudi and that the Regional Transport Authority had given one mark to the first respondent under, the said column; but the Appellate Tribunal rejected that contention on the ground that the first respondent had a branch office at Kumbakonam and therefore, the office at Tanjore or Mannargudi could not be treated as a branch office. Aggrieved by that order, the first respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for setting aside that order.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court issued the writ as it was satisfied that there was a clear error apparent on the face of the record, namely, that the Appellate Tribunal refused to take into consideration the existence of the branch office at Mannargudi for awarding marks under the head "residence" on the ground that there was another office of the first respondent at Kumbakonam. While it gave marks to the appellant for his residence, it refused to give marks to the first respondent for its office on the aforesaid ground.
Issues: 1. Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of a tribunal on the ground that there is an apparent error of fact on the face of the record, however gross it may be? 2. Whether, in the instant case, if there was an error, it was only one of fact?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The scope of a writ of certiorari in common law is to correct errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. 2. Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. 3. The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. 4. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. 5. The concept of "error of law apparent on the face of the record" is not capable of precise definition as no objective criterion can be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element. 6. In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record by refusing to take into consideration the existence of the branch office at Mannargudi for awarding marks under the head "residence" on the ground that there was another office of the first respondent at Kumbakonam.
Final Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Judgment
SUBBA RAO, J. : This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Madras confirming that of a single Judge of that Court allowing the petition filed by the respondent under Art. 226 of the Constitution and quashing the order made by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal granting a stage carnage permit to the appellant for the route Tanjore-Mannargudi via Vaduvoor.
2. The facts relevant to the question raised may be briefly stated. The Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, called for applications in respect of the issuing of a stage carriage permit for the route Tanjore-Mannargudi via Vaduvoor. 11 persons applied for the permit. The Regional Transport Authority, adopting the marking system prescribed in G. O. Ms. No. 1298 (Home) dated April 28, 1956, awarded marks to different applicants: the appellant got the highest number of marks, viz., 7, and the first respondent got only 44 marks, with the result the appellant was preferred to the respondent & a permit was issued to him. It is not necessary to notice the marks secured by the other applicants before the Regional Transport Authority, for they are not before us. Total of the said marks secured by each of the said two parties was arrived at by adding the marks given under the following heads:
Viable Workshop Residence Experience Special Cir- TOTAL
Unit cumstances
K.M.S 4 1 1 1/2 1/1 1/1 7
S.R.V.S. - 1 1 1 1} 4}
It would be seen from the said table of marks that if the 4 marks secured by the appellant under the first column "Viable Unit" were excluded from his total, he would have got only a total of 3 marks under the remaining heads and the first respondent would have got a total of 44 marks under the said heads. Under the said G.O., as interpreted by this Court, the marks under the first column i.e., those given under the head "Viable Unit", would be counted only if other things were equal; that is to say, if the total number of marks obtained by the said two applicants under Cols. 2 to 5 were equal. It is, therefore, obvious that on the marks given the Regional Transport Authority went wrong in issuing a permit in favour of the appellant, as he should not have taken into consideration the 4 marks given under the 1st Column since the total marks secured by him under Cols. 2 to 5 were less than those secured by the first respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent preferred an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter called the Appellate Tribunal. The said Appellate Tribunal recast the marks in respect of the said two parties in the following manner :
Viable Workshop Residence Experience Special Cir- TOTAL
Unit cumstances
K.M.S 4 2 1 3/4 1/4 8
S.R.V.S. - 2 - 1 1 4
It would be seen from the marks given by the Appellate Tribunal that the total of the marks secured by the appellant under Cols. 2 to 5 is equal to that secured by the first respondent under the said columns, each of them securing 4 marks. It was contended before the Appellate Tribunal that the first respondent was entitled to some mark under the column "Residence or place of business" on the ground that it had the places of business at Tanjore and Mannargudi and that the Regional Transport Authority had given one mark to the first respondent under, the said column; but the Appellate Tribunal rejected that contention on the ground that the first respondent had a branch office at Kumbakonam and therefore, the office at Tanjore or Mannargudi could not be treated as a branch office. Aggrieved by that order, the first respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for setting aside that order. Ramachandra Iyer, J. who heard the said application allowed it. The main reason given by the learned Judge for allowing the petition was that the Appellate Tribunal omitted to give any mark in respect of residential qualification, which amounted to refusal to take into consideratio
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