The work of imparting education carried on by educational institutions like the University of Delhi is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.

Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : These two appeals by special leave arise out of two petitions filed against the University of Delhi and Principal Miranda House University College for Women, appellants 1 and 2, by two of their employees Ram Nath and Asgar Masih, respondents 1 and 2 respectively, under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act ). Appellant No.2 which is the University College for women is run by appellant No.1, and so, in substance, the claim made by the two employees was mainly against appellant No.1. Ram Nath s case was that he had been employed as driver by appellant No.2 in Oct. 1, 1949 and was served with a notice on the 1st May 1961 that since his services were no longer required, he would be discharged from his employment on payment of one month s salary in lieu of notice. Asgar Masih made substantially similar allegations. He had been employed in the first instance, by appellant No.1 as driver but was then transferred to appellant No. 2 on the 1st October 1949. His services were similarly terminated by notice on the 1st May 1961 on payment of one month s salary in advance in lien of notice. It is common ground that appellant No.1 found that running the buses for the convenience of the girl students attending the college run by appellant No. 2 resulted in loss, and so, it was decided to discontinue that amenity. Inevitably, the services of the two drivers had to be retrenched, and so, there is no dispute that the retrenchment is genuine and there is no element of mala fides or unfair labour practice involved in it. It is also common ground that if the employees are workmen within the meaning of the Act, and the work carried on by the appellants is an industry under S.2(j)/S 25F has not been complied with and retrenchment amount payable under it has not been paid to the respondents. The petitions made by the respondents were resisted by appellant No.1 on the preliminary ground that appellant No.1 was not an employer under S.2(g), that the work carried on by it was not an industry under S.2(j), and so, the applications made under S.33C(2) were incompetent. The Tribunal has rejected this preliminary objections and having considered the merits, has passed an order in favour of the respondents directing the appellants to pay Rs.1050/- to each one of the respondents as retrenchment compensation. It is the validity of this award that is challenged before us by the appellants, and the only ground on which the challenge is made is that the work carried on by appellant No.1 is not an industry under S.2(j).

2. Though the question thus raised by these two appeals lies within a narrow compass, its importance is very great. If it is held that the work of imparting education conducted by educational institutions like the University of Delhi is an industry under S.2(j), all the educational institutions in the country may be brought within the purview of the Act and disputes arising between them and their employees would be industrial disputes which can be referred for adjudication under S.10(1) of the Act and in appropriate cases, applications can be made by the employees under S. 33C(2). The appellants contend that the Tribunal was in error in giving the definition of the word industry under S.2(j) its widest denotation by adopting a mechanical and literal rule of construction and it is urged that the policy of the Act clearly is to leave education and educational institutions out of the purview of the Act.

3. On the other hand, the respondents contend that S. 2(j) has defined the word industry, deliberately in words of widest amplitude and there is no justification for putting any artificial restraint on the meaning of the said word as defined. In support of this argument reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1960) 2 SCR 866 at p. 879. In that case this Court observed that "as a working principle, it may be s