The provisions in sub-cl. (7) of Cl. 9 of the Statutory Order requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court were imperative and not merely directory.

Judgment

SARKAR, J.: These two appeals have been heard together. The appellants in each case are the State of Uttar Pradesh, for short called U. P., and some of its Officers and the respondents in one appeal are Lakshmi Ice Factory and certain of its workers and in the other the Prakash Ice Factory and certain of its workers. These appeals involve a question of construction of certain provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereafter referred to as the Act.

2. By a Notification issued on February 10, 1956, the Government of U. P. referred certain disputes which had cropped up between each of the Ice Factories and its respective workmen, to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The details of these disputes are not material for these appeals. The Tribunal heard the matters but failed to pronounce its award in open court. Instead, on November 8,1956, the Registrar of the Tribunal informed the Ice Factories that the award of the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government. On December 15, 1956, the award was published in the U.P. Gazette an it appeared from this publication that the award was dated November, 8, 1956. On December 26, 1956, the Regional Conciliation Officer appointed under the Act called upon the Ice factories to implement the award immediately. Thereupon, the Ice factories moved the High Court at Allahabad on January 3., 1957, under Art. 226 of the Constitution for writs quashing the award and prohibiting the Government and the workmen from taking steps to implement it. The contended that the award sought to be enforced was a nullity as it had not been pronounced in open court as required by certain rules to which reference will presently be made. By a judgment passed on September 23, 1939, the High Court allowed the petitions of the Ice Factories and issued writs quashing the Notification publishing the award. The appeals are against this judgement of the High Court.

3. Section 3 of the Act gives the Government power in certain circumstances to make provisions by general or special order (1)for appointing Industrial Courts, (2) for referring any industrial dispute for adjudication in the manner provided in the order & (3) for matters incidental or supplementary to the other provisions of the order. Under this power the Government had issued an Order dated July 14, 1954 and this Order is here after called the "Statutory Order." It was under powers conferred by the Act read with the Statutory Order that the Government had issued the Notification of February 10, 1956.

4. In exercise of powers conferred by Cl. 8 of the Statutory Order the Government had set up the Tribunal. Clause 9 of the Statutory Order provides for the procedure, to be followed by the Tribunal. Sub-clause (7 )of this clause is in these terms: "The decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be pronounced in open court and dated and signed by the member or members of the Tribunal, as the case may be, at the time of pronouncing it." Clause 11 of the Statutory Order gives power to the Government to refer any industrial dispute to the Tribunal

5. Sub-clause (S.) of C. 9 of the Statutory Order gives power to the Tribunal to make Standing Orders relating to its practice and procedure. Under this sub-clause the Tribunal framed certain Standing Orders Standing Order No. 36 provided, "Judgment shall be pronounced in open court either immediately after the close of the arguments or on a subsequent date of which previous notice shall be given to the parties. It shall then be signed and dated by the Tribunal."

6. Acting presumably under Standing Order No. 36, the Tribunal in the present case had fixed a date on which it would pronounce its judgment in open court. This date does not appear on the record but on September 25, 1956, the Tribunal informed the parties that the date for pronouncing the award had been changed to October 9,1956. On that date however, the award was not pronounced in open court, nor was any intimation of any oth