Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
30th August, 1962
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.
1. Ram Sarup (In C.A. No. 139 of 1961) 2. Dalip Singh and others (In C.A. No. 147 of 1961). 3. Mehar Singh and others (In C.A. No. 214 of 1961) 4. Dayal Singh (in C.A. No. 510 of 1961), Appellants
Versus
1. Munshi and others (In CA. No. 139 of 1961) 2. Sunder Singh and others (In C.A. 147 of 1961) 3. Ajaib Singh and others (In C.A. No. 214 of 1961) 4. Surjan Singh (In C A. No. 510 of 1961), Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 139. 147, 214 and 510 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
In Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1961 Mr. J,P. Goyal, Advocate for Appellant; Mr. Nanak Chand, Advocate, for Respondent No.1. In Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1961 M/s. Hardyal Hardy and N. N. Keswani, Advocates, for Appellants; M/s. Dayal Swarup Nehra and K.R. Chaudhuri, Advocates, for Respondent No.1; In Civil Appeal No. 214 of 1961, M/s Hardev Singh and Y. Kumar, Advocates, for Appellants, Nos. 2 to 5; Mr. K.L. Gosain, Senior Advocate, (Mr. M.L. Aggarwala, Advocate with him), for Respondents Nos.1 to 4. In Civil Appeal No. 510 of 1961. Mr. P.S. Safeer. Advocate, for Appellant; Mr. Achhru Ram Senior Advocate, (Mr. B. D. lain, Advocate, with him), for Respondent.
PRE-EMPTION - S.15 OF THE PUNJAB PRE-EMPTION ACT, 1913 - CONSTITUTIONALITY - REASONABLENESS OF THE RESTRICTION - GROUNDS FOR UPHOLDING S.15(A) AS REASONABLE AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC - AMENDMENT OF S.15 BY PUNJAB ACT 10 OF 1960 - RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT - S.31 OF THE ACT - CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE.
Fact of the Case:
These four appeals which have been filed pursuant to special leave granted by this Court principally raise for consideration the constitutional validity of S.15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (Act 1 of 1913) hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the right of pre-emption granted by S.15(a) of the Act is a reasonable restriction on the right of vendors "to hold and dispose of property", and of prospective vendees "to acquire property" guaranteed to citizens of India by Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.
Issues: 1. Whether S.15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 is constitutionally valid? 2. Whether the grounds for upholding S.15(a) as reasonable and in the interest of the general public are valid? 3. Whether the amendment of S.15 by Punjab Act 10 of 1960 has retrospective effect? 4. Whether S.31 of the Act should be construed to allow an appellate court to set aside a decree for pre-emption passed in favor of the respondent before the Court?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the right of pre-emption granted by S.15(a) of the Act is a reasonable restriction on the right of vendors "to hold and dispose of property", and of prospective vendees "to acquire property" guaranteed to citizens of India by Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 2. The Court held that the grounds for upholding S.15(a) as reasonable and in the interest of the general public are valid, namely: - to preserve the integrity of the village and the village community. - to implement the agnatic rule of succession. 3. The Court held that the amendment of S.15 by Punjab Act 10 of 1960 has retrospective effect by virtue of S.31 of the Act. 4. The Court held that S.31 of the Act should be construed to allow an appellate court to set aside a decree for pre-emption passed in favor of the respondent before the Court.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree in favor of the respondent, and dismissed the respondent's suit for pre-emption.
Judgment
AYYANGAR, J. : These four appeals which have been filed pursuant to special leave granted by this Court principally raise for consideration the constitutional validity of S.15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (Act 1 of 1913) hereinafter referred to as the Act. The property involved in these appeals are agricultural lands and in each one of them decrees have been passed in favour of the pre-emptors whose claim to pre-empt was based on different sub-clauses of S.15 and the vendees who are the appellants in the several appeals challenge the constitutional validity of the law under which the suits have been decreed.
2. One of the appeals- Civil Appeal No.214 of 1961 however could be decided without considering the constitutional point regarding the validity of S.15 of the Act and it would therefore be convenient to dispose it of first. The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly as follows: The 5th and 6th respondents before us owned certain agricultural land in village Dugri which they sold to the appellants by a deed dated April 25, 1957. Respondents 1 to 4 instituted a suit against the appellants to which the vendor-respondents 5 and 6 were also impleaded as co- defendants. The right of pre-emption was based on the plaintiffs being the nearest collaterals of the vendors and heirs according to the rule of succession. There were certain points of dispute on the facts but these are not now material and it is sufficient to state that the suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge on December 10, 1958. This judgment in favour of respondents 1 to 4 was affirmed by the District Judge on appeal and on further appeal by the High Court. It is from this judgment and decree of the High Court that the vendees who are the appellants before us have brought the matter to this Court.
3. The appellants were five in number. They fell into two groups constituted respectively by the 1st and 2nd appellants who are brothers and by appellants 3, 4 and 5. While the appeal was pending in this Court the 1st appellant- Mehar Singh died on May 18, 1960 leaving a widow and five children- four daughters and a son, as his heirs. No application was however, made to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased 1st appellant - Mehar Singh and learned Counsel appearing for the other four appellants informed the office that the legal representatives were not being brought on record and that he would proceed with the appeal on behalf of the four surviving appellants.
4. At the hearing of the appeal learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appeal ought to be dismissed as incompetent since the same had abated on the death of the first appellant without his legal representatives being brought on record. Learned Counsel for the appellants, however, contended that whatever might be the position as regards the share to which Mehar Singh was entitled in the property purchased, the interest of the deceased was distinct and separate from that of the others and that the abatement could be in any event only partial and would not affect the continuance of the appeal by the surviving appellants at least as regards their share in the property. As the deed of sale under which the appellants purchased the property was not among the printed records of this Court, the appeal was adjourned in order to enable learned Counsel for the appellants to produce it and substantiate his contention that the interest of the deceased Mehar Singh was distinct and separate. An English translation of the deed of sale has now been produced before us and a perusal of it indicates that the submission made on behalf of the appellants is not sustainable. The consideration for the sale is a sum of Rs. 22,750/- and the conveyance recites that Mehar Singh and the second appellant had paid one half amounting to Rs. 11,375/- while the other three appellants had paid the other half. It is therefore not a case of a sale of any separated item of property in favour of the deceased-
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
