The court clarified that the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before the amendment came into force, and Section 31 does not save the assessment.

Headnote:
Section 34 - Assessment Time Limit - The court held that the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before the amendment came into force, and Section 31 does not save the assessment.
Fact of the Case:

The relevant assessment years were 1946-1947 and 1947-1948. The assessment orders were made on November 27, 1953, which exceeded the time prescribed by sub-section (3) of Section 34.
Finding of the Court:

The court dismissed the appeals with costs, as the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before the amendment came into force, and Section 31 does not save the assessment.
Issues: The issue revolved around the applicability of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 and Section 31 of the Amending Act of 1953 in relation to the assessment time limit.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before the amendment came into force, and Section 31 does not save the assessment.
Final Decision: The appeals were dismissed with costs, and one hearing fee was imposed.

Judgment

S. K. DAS, J. : The facts out of which these two appeals have arisen have been stated in the judgment of my learned brother Kapur, J., and as I am in full agreement with the conclusion reached by him, I need not re-state the facts.

2. The relevant assessment years were 1946-1947 and 1947-1948. The assessment orders were made on November 27, 1953. It is obvious that the assessments were not made within the time prescribed by sub-section (3) of Section 34, the period being four years in this case. The Tribunal relied on the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 as amended by the Amending Act of 1953 which came into force on April 1, 1952. For reasons which I have given in S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, Civil Appeal No. 705 of 1957: in which judgment has been delivered to-day, the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not revive a remedy which became barred before April 1, 1952, when the amended proviso came into force.

3. Next, the appellant relied on Section 31 of the Amending Act of 1953. I agree with my learned brother Kapur J., that the question of law which was referred to the High Court does not take in the point now sought to be urged before us. Secondly, for reasons given by me in Civil Appeal No. 705 of 1957: (supra), I do not think that Section 31 saves the assessment.

4. I would accordingly dismiss the appeals with costs; one hearing fee.

KAPUR, J.:

5. These are two appeals pursuant to a certificate granted by the High Court of Patna against the judgment and order of that Court in which the following question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was answered in the negative and against the appellant:

"Whether having regard to the return dated the 7th March, 1951, by Sardar Lakhmir Singh in hi

For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 1394

Click Here to Read the rest of this document