The acquisition of land for a public purpose by a corporation is bad if no Part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, have not been complied with.

Judgement

MUDHOLKAR, J. : This judgment will also govern CA. No. 123 of 1963. These two appeals have come up before this Court by virtue of special leave granted by it on April 27, 1960.

2. The appellants before us were plaintiffs in suits instituted by them before the second Joint Civil Judge (S. D.), Ahmedabad, in which they challenged the validity of certain proceedings instituted by the then Government of Bombay for acquiring a piece of land belonging to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of constructing a bus depot required by the State Transport Corporation and for constructing office and other buildings by the said Corporation. The appellants in addition, sought an injunction restraining the State of Bombay and the State Transport Corporation for proceeding with the acquisition and dispossessing them. The suit was founded on a number of grounds but ultimately when the matter went up to the High Court in second appeal Mr. Rajni Patel who appeared for the appellants based the claim only on three grounds: (1) that the purpose mentioned in the notification under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or vague and, therefore, the notification was bad;(2) that the proceedings were collusive and were initiated by the State Government for the benefit of the owner of the land, the second respondent; (3) that the State Transport Corporation was not a local authority but merely a company and as the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act were not complied with, the acquisition was bad.

3. Mr. J. C. Bhatt who appears for the appellants before us has likewise confined his attack to these three grounds. on behalf of the respondents it was contended in the Courts below and is contended before us that the Corporation is a local authority within the meaning of the expression as used in the Land Acquisition Act, that even if it is held that it is not a local authority the acquisition was made at public expense, that the purpose of the acquisition is a public purpose and that the appellants are not entitled to go behind the notification of the Government issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and finally that the acquisition was not mala fide or collusive. In addition, the learned Attorney General, who appeared for the respondents 1 and 3, contended that the suits were premature in as much as they were instituted before the notification under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made.

4. Taking up the last point first, we may point out that no such plea was taken on be half of the respondents in the trial Court. This point was apparently not taken because even before the written statement was filed a notification under S. 6 was in fact made by the State Government. The suits proceeded throughout on the footing that there was no formal defect in regard to their maintainability. In the circumstances we do not think that it would be four to allow the suits to be defeated merely on such a technical ground.

5. Coming to the first point raised on behalf of the appellants it is sufficient to point out that the notification under S. 4 of the Act clearly stated that the acquisition is for a public purpose namely, for State Transport. The notification under S. 6 reiterates this fact and in addition says that the land was needed to be acquired for the purposes of and at the expense of the State Transport Corporation. There is thus a clear declaration of the Government that the purpose of acquisition was a Public purpose and as has been consistently held by this Court in a number of cases, including the most recent one, Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 the declaration as to public purpose by the Government is final except where it is a colourable exercise of power. Unless, therefore, it is shown that there was collusion as alleged by the appellants between the respondents 1 and 3 on the one hand and respondent No. 2 on the other, the notification will have to be regarded as conclusive on the question that