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1963 Supreme(SC) 274

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
29th November, 1963.
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.
Manipur Administration, Appellant
Versus
M. Nila Chandra Singh, Respondent.
Criminal appeal No. 143 of 1962.
Advocates appeared
M/s. B. K. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, Advocate, for Appellant; Dr. W. S. Barlingay, Senior Advocate, (Mr. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocate, with him), for Respondent.

Advocates:
A.C.RATNAPARKHI, B.K.Khanna, R.N.SACH, W.S.Barlingay

The presumption under cl. 3(2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, only establishes that the person has stored the foodgrains for sale, but it does not establish that the person is carrying on the business of a dealer.

Headnote:

MANIPUR FOODGRAINS DEALERS LICENCING ORDER, 1958 - CL. 3(2) - CONSTRUCTION - PRESUMPTION OF STORAGE FOR SALE - SCOPE AND EFFECT.

Fact of the Case:

The respondent was charged with storing 178 Mds. of paddy without a license in violation of cl. 3 of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958. He claimed that the paddy was meant for his family's consumption and that 40 Mds. belonged to his relation, Lalito Singh. The trial court convicted him, but the Sessions Judge and the Judicial Commissioner acquitted him, holding that the presumption under cl. 3(2) did not establish that he was a dealer.

Finding of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the presumption under cl. 3(2) only established that the respondent had stored the paddy for sale, but it did not establish that he was carrying on the business of a dealer. The Court found that the definition of "dealer" in cl. 2(a) required continuity of transactions and that a single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase, or storage would not make a person a dealer.

Issues: Whether the presumption under cl. 3(2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, established that the respondent was a dealer.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the presumption under cl. 3(2) only established that the respondent had stored the paddy for sale, but it did not establish that he was carrying on the business of a dealer. The Court found that the definition of "dealer" in cl. 2(a) required continuity of transactions and that a single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase, or storage would not make a person a dealer.

Final Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal of the respondent.

Judgement

GAJENDRAGADKAR. J.: The short question of law which arises in this appeal relates to the construction of cl. 3(2) of the Manipur Foodgrains Dealers Licencing Order, 1958. This question arises in this way.

2. The respondent was charged with having committed an offence punishable under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 in that on February 9, 1960, he was found storing 178 Mds. of paddy in his godown without any licence in violation of cl. 3 of the said Order. The case against the respondent was that on February 9, 1960, his godown was searched and 178 Mds. of paddy was found stored in it. This fact was not denied by the respondent though he pleaded that the paddy which was found in his godown was meant for the consumption of the members of his family who numbered fifteen. He also pleaded that out of the stock found in his godown 40 mds. of paddy belonged to Lalito Singh, his relation. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bishenpur, who tried the case of the respondent did not believe his statement that the stock was meant for the consumption of the members of his family. He, however, believed the evidence of Lalito Singh that 40 Mds. out of the stock belonged to him, and so he passed an order directing that out, of the stock which had been attached 40 Mds, should be released in favour of Lalito Singh. In regard to the rest of the stock, the learned trial Magistrate came to the conclusion that as a result of the provisions contained incl. 3(2) of the Order a presumption arose against the respondent and that presumption took his case under cl. 3(1) of the Order. That in turn attracted the provisions of cl. 7 of the Order and made the respondent liable under S. 7 of the Essential commodities act. On these findings the learned Magistrate convicted the respondent of the offence charged. He, however, held that it was not necessary to direct the forfeiture of the paddy and that the ends of justice would be met if he was fined to pay Rs. 500/- default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months.

3. Against this Order the respondent preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge at Manipur. The learned Sessions Judge substantially agreed with the view taken by the learned Magistrate. He believed the witnesses who have referred to the circumstances under which the paddy stored in the godown of the respondent was recovered, and he held that the respondent had been properly convicted under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The order of sentence also was confirmed.

4. The respondent then moved the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur, by a Revision Application and his Revision Application succeeded. It appears that before the present Revision Application came on for hearing before the learned Judicial Commissioner he had examined the question of law in regard to the construction of clause 3(2) of the Order in a group of revision applications Nos. 7, 11 and 13 of 1961, and had pronounced his judgment on June 5, 1961. He had held in that judgment that the effect of the presumption which can be legitimately raised under cl. 3(2) is not that the person against whom the said presumption has been drawn is a dealer in respect of the said goods; and so, merely on the strength of the said presumption, sub-clause 3(1) cannot be attracted; following his earlier decision the learned Judicial Commissioner allowed the respondent s Revision Application and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against him. It is against this order that the Manipur Administration has come to this Court by special leave, and on behalf of the appellant Mr. B. K. Khanna has contended that the view taken by the learned Judicial Commissioner is based on a misconstruction of cl. 3(2) of the Order. That is how the only question which falls for our decision in the present appeal is in regard to the construction of the said clause.

5. At this stage, it would be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Order. Clause 2(a) define













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