Judgement

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. : This appeal, by special leave, raises the question of the correct interpretation of S. 18(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Act 1 of 1877), hereinafter called the Act.

2. Ramchandra, respondent, executed an agreement to sell the house in suit to the appellant, on February 21, 1951. The agreement stated that he was in sole possession and enjoyment of the house which was his paternal property, that he was the Managing Member and Karta of the family and that for meeting family necessities and discharging certain loans he agreed to sell his undisputed house for Rs. 6,000/- on condition that he and his mother would execute a deed of sale in favour of the appellant with respect to the house within a period of one year from the date of the execution of the deed of agreement. Ramchandra did not execute the sale deed and the appellant instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract.

3. The trial Court held that the sale was not to be for legal necessity and therefore decreed the suit in part, on the appellant s depositing a sum of Rs. 6,000/- less the sum of Rs. 300/ paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of the execution of the agreement to sell and less the amount of costs granted to the appellant against Ramchandra within a month and directed that defendant No. 1 would execute the sale deed for the alienation of his interest in the entire house as covered by the agreement and that the plaintiff would be entitled to get possession of the same jointly with defendant No. 2 mother of Ramchandra.

4. The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court against the dismissal of his suit with respect to the sale of half the house. During the pendency of the appeal Ramchandra s mother died, and therefore the only question urged on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal was that Ramchandra, respondent, having perfected his title to the entire house, be made to sell the same. The High Court did not agree with the contention and held that S. 18(a) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the case as it comes into operation subsequent to the sale having taken place. The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal. It is against this order that this appeal has been filed.

5. Section 18(a) of the Act reads:

"Where a person contracts to sell or let certain property, having only an imperfect title thereto, the purchaser or lessee (except as otherwise provided by this Chapter) has the following rights:-

(a) if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the sale or lease acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest:"

6. The question is whether the expression subsequently to the sale or lease means subsequently to the contract to sell or let or means subsequently to the execution of the sale deed or lease deed by the vendor or the lessor, as the case may be in pursuance of the contract to sell or let. It is contended for the appellant that this expression means subsequently to the contract to sell or let, while the contention for the respondent is that it means subsequent to the actual sale or lease. We are inclined to agree with the contention for the appellant.

7. The case, in a way, is concluded by the decision of this Court in Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1954 SCR 958. In that case the Government agreed to let the lease of the hills to Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd., but the lease could not be executed as the forfeiture of the lease of a previous lessee was held invalid by the Court. When the lease of the previous lessee expired, Kalyanpur Works Ltd., wanted the execution of the lease for a period during which the lease to it would have continued if it had been granted in 1934. This Court held that the case fell within S. 18 (a) of the Act. It said at p. 972 (of SCR).

"We agree with the High Court that section 18(a) of Specific Relief Act applies to the case. That section lays down that where a person contr