Judgment

AYYANGAR J. - This appeal is against a judgment of the High Court, Punjab dismissing a petition filed by the appellant in that Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and has been preferred pursuant to a certificate of fitness granted under Art. 133 (1) (c).

2. The appellant was a Civil Surgeon in the employment of the State Government who had been granted leave preparatory to retirement and subsequently, in June 1961, orders were passed by Government (1) revoking the leave he had originally been grantd and recalling him to duty, (2) simultaneously placing him under suspension pending the result of an inquiry into certain charges of misconduct, and (3) ordering a departmental inquiry against him. The legality of these orders was challenged by the appellant in the petition that he filed in the High Court. The petition was dismissed by the learned Judges, but on application by the appellant, he was granted a certificate of fitness on the strength of which he has filed the present appeal.

3. The facts of the case leading up to the appeal before us are set out by our learned Brother Dayal J. in his judgment fully and in great detail and so we have thought it unnecessary to cumber this judgment with them. Two points were urged before us by the appellant who argued the case in person and presented the facts and the law with commendable clarity and moderation. The first of them was that every one of the impugned orders of June 1961 (a) recalling him from the leave previously granted, (b) placing him under suspension pending an inquiry, and (c) starting an inquiry against him was illegal for the reason that such action on the part of Government was contrary to and not permitted by the relevant Service Rules applicable to him. The second ground of challenge was that these orders, assuming them to be within the power of Government on a proper interpretation of the rules were passed mala fide, by or at the instance of the Chief Minister, Punjab who was personally hostile to him by reason of certain incidents and circumstances which he set out and that the impugned orders were prompted by the desire on the part of the Chief Minister to wreak personally his vengeance on the appellant.

4. The relevant rules on the topic as well as their interpretation have all been dealt in the judgment of Dayal J. and we agree in the main with his conclusion that the orders impugned were not beyond-the power of the Government. We should, however, add that we should not be taken to have accepted the interpretation which Dayal J. has placed on each one of the several rules which he has considered. Besides, we should not be taken to have accepted the submission of the learned Attorney-General who appeared for the respondent-State, that the provision in Art. 310 (1) of the Constitution that "members of a Civil Service of a State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor", conferred a power on the State Government to compel an officer to continue in service of the State against his will apart from service rules which might govern the matter even after the age of superannuation was reached, or where he was employed for a defined term, even after the term of his appointment was over. We consider that to construe the expression "the pleasure of the Governor" in that manner would be patently unwarranted besides being contrary to what this Court said in State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, 1954 S C R 786 at p. 799: (AIR 1954 S C 245 at pp. 249-250). In the view which we have taken on the second ground of challenge to the orders of Government we have not considered it necessary to examine in detail the several rules to which our attention was drawn or their proper interpretation.

5. We shall now proceed to deal with the second point urged before us viz., that the order was passed mala fide and so could not be allowed to stand. Before entering into the details of the allegations made, the evidence in their support and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, we cons