1. Partition suit concerning an impartible estate — dispute over incorporation of self-acquired immovable properties and classification of family jewels as impartible regalia under customary Hindu law. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
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1962 Supreme(SC) 238
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.
1. Mirza Raja Pushpavathi Vijayaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 and 171 of 1961) 2. Rajkumar Pushavati Visweswara Gajapathi Raj (In Civil Appeals Nos. 172 and 173 of 1961) 3. Shrimathi Rani Pushavathi Vidyavathi Devi Varu (died) and others (In Civil Appeals Nos. 174 and 175 of 1961) 4. Rani Pushavathi Lalitha Kumari Devi Dowager (In Civil Appeals Nos. 176 and 177 of 1961). Appellants
Versus
1. Sri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapathiraj Rajkumar of Vizianagram and others (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 and 171 of 1961) 2. Mirza Raja Pushpavathi Vijayaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur and others etc. (In Civil Appeals Nos. 172 and 177 of 1961), Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to 177 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate, (M/s. P. Rama Reddy, V. V. Raghavan, K. S. Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, Advocates, with him), for Appellant (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 and 171 of 1961) and Respondent No. 1 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 177 of 1961); Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Senior Advocate, Mr. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, Mr. S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, Senior Advocate, (M/s. C. Ramakrishna, S. Mohan, T. Suryanarayana Murty and T. V. R. Tatachari, Advocates, with them), for Appellant (In Civil Appeals Nos. 172 and 173 of 1961) and Respondent No. 1 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 and 171 of 1961) and Respondent No. 2 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 174 to 177 of 1961); Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate (M/s. D. V. Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, Advocates, with him), for Appellants (In Civil Appeals Nos. 174 and 175 of 1961) and Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to 173 of 1961) and Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to 177 of 1961); Mr. C. B. Agarwala, Senior Advocate, (Mr. K. K. Jain, Advocate, with him), for Appellant (In Civil Appeals Nos. 176 and 177 of 1961) and Respondent No. 4 (In Civil Appeals Nos. 174 and 175 of 1961).
An impartible estate is joint family property where the holder can incorporate self-acquired immovable property via intention. Movables are impartible only if a specific, ancient family custom is proved. Under the 1948 Act, "the person who owned" buildings refers specifically to the landholder.
Headnote:(A) Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 - Section 18(4) and Section 45 - Madras Impartible Estates Acts II/1902, II/1903 and II/1904 - Impartible Estate - Ownership of buildings - The expression "the person who owned" in Section 18(4) refers only to the landholder and not to all members of the joint Hindu family. A wider interpretation would lead to an anomalous result where a larger class of persons would be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 18(4) than those entitled to claim apportionment of compensation under Section 45. (Paras 19, 20)
(B) Hindu Law - Impartible Estate - Doctrine of Incorporation - An estate impartible by custom is joint family property where the right of survivorship remains, although the right of partition is excluded. The holder of such an estate, unless excluded by statute or custom, can incorporate self-acquired immovable property into the estate by a declaration of intention, making such property impartible and subject to primogeniture. The crucial test for incorporation is the intention of the acquirer, proved by conduct. (Paras 12, 13)
(C) Hindu Law - Movable Property - Family Custom - The doctrine of incorporation does not apply to movable property. However, a specific category of movables can be treated as impartible if a family custom is proved. Such custom must be ancient, invariable, and established by clear and unambiguous evidence. (Paras 14, 17)
Facts of the case:
A partition suit was filed by the eldest son of a family owning a large impartible estate against his brother, mother, uncle, and grandmother. The dispute centered on whether certain subsequently acquired immovable properties and specific jewels were part of the impartible estate or partible joint family property. The trial court and appellate court had differing views on the incorporation of several buildings and the status of certain jewels as regalia.
Findings of Court:
The court upheld the findings that a public market and certain leasehold rights were incorporated into the impartible estate. It held that five specific bungalows were not incorporated and remained partible. It affirmed that 38 jewels constituted regalia and were impartible. The claim of the grandmother for certain jewels as stridhan was restored by consent with modifications.
Issues: (i) Whether the expression "the person who owned" in Section 18(4) of the 1948 Act includes all members of a joint Hindu family; (ii) Whether subsequently acquired buildings and leasehold rights were incorporated into the impartible estate; (iii) Whether certain jewels could be treated as regalia and thus impartible by family custom.
Ratio Decidendi: Incorporation of immovable property depends on the intention of the holder, which must be proved by conduct. For movables, impartibility must be based on a proven family custom. Under the 1948 Act, the statutory benefit of building ownership vests in the landholder, not the general family members, to maintain consistency with compensation provisions.
Result: Appeals preferred by defendants 1 and 2 dismissed; appeals preferred by the plaintiff dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- family law
- property law
- administrative law
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Whether subsequently acquired properties and specific jewels were incorporated into the impartible estate — interpretation of ownership under Section 18(4) of the Madras Estates Act, 1948. (Para 9 , 10 , 18 , 19 , 23 , 25 )
3. Incorporation depends on intention — family customs regarding regalia can outlive the conditions of their birth — adoption preserves the continuity of such customs. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 24 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 34 , 35 )
4. Holder of customary impartible estate can incorporate self-acquired immovable property by intention — family customs regarding impartibility of movables must be proved by clear, unambiguous evidence. (Para 13 , 14 , 17 )
5. Appeals by defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiff dismissed — trial court decree restored for defendant 4 with modifications. (Para 11 , 33 , 36 )
6. Can a holder of a customary impartible estate incorporate self-acquired immovable property into the estate?
Yes, unless excluded by statute or custom, a holder can incorporate self-acquired immovable property by declaring their intention. Once incorporated, the property becomes part of the impartible estate and follows the custom of descent by primogeniture. (Para 13 , 14 )
7. How is the impartibility of movable property, such as family jewels, established under Hindu law?
Movable property cannot be incorporated like immovable property; instead, impartibility must be proved through family custom. Such customs must be ancient, invariable, and established by clear and unambiguous evidence of the family's traditional beliefs and conduct. (Para 14 , 17 )
8. Does the adoption of a successor break the continuity of family customs regarding impartible property?
No, adoption does not necessarily break the continuity. If the adopted member is treated as part of the family and the parties' conduct shows an intention to continue old customs, those customs remain operative. (Para 26 )
9. Does the phrase person who owned in Section 18(4) of the Madras Estates Act, 1948, include all members of a joint Hindu family?
No, the expression refers only to the landholder or proprietor. Including a larger class of persons would create an anomaly compared to the narrower class entitled to compensation under Section 45 of the Act. (Para 19 , 20 )
10. Does the abolition of a Zamindari estate automatically terminate customs regarding the impartibility of regalia?
No, family customs can outlive the conditions that gave birth to them. The principle that a law ceases when its reason ceases does not apply where a family agrees to continue observing a custom. (Para 24 )
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR J. :This group of eight appeals which has been brought to this Court with a certificate issued by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, arises out of a partition suit filed by the plaintiff Viziaram Gajapathi Raj II against his younger brother Visweswar Gajapathi Raj, Defendant No. 1, his mother Vidyavathi Devi, Defendant No. 2, his uncle Sir Vijayanand Gajapathi Raj, Defendant No. 3, and his grnad-mother Lalitha Kumari Devi, Defendant No. 4. The parties to this litigation are members of the Vizianagaram family which owns a very large estate. This estate is impartible and devolves by primogeniture. The relevant genealogy of the family which is set out at the end of this judgment clearly brings out the relationship between the parties, and shows at a glance how the Vizianagaram Estate was held by different holders from time to time. Narayana Gajapathi Raj may be regarded as the founder of the family. His son who succeeded to the estate on the estate on the death of his father in 1845 can claim to be the real maker of the fortunes of this family. He managed the 121 estate from 1845 to 1879 and during the course of his management he bought a large amount of property, movable and immovable including a large estate in and around Banaras. At his death he left behind him his only son Ananda Gajapathi Raj and his daughter Appala Kondayamba I. Appala Kondayamba I subsequently became the Maharani of Rewa. Ananda Gajapathi Raj died issueless on 23rd May 1897. Before his death, he had executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his maternal uncle s son Chitti Babu, Later on December 18, 1897, Ananda Gajapathi Raj s mother Alak Rajeswari I adopted Chitti Babu to her husband, so that as a result of his adoption, Chitti Babu became the adoptive brother of Ananda Gajapathi Raj who had executed a will in his favour before his death. It appears that Chitti Babu had been brought up in the Vizianagaram family and when Ananda Gajapathi Raj executed his will, it was anticipated that Chitti Babu would, in due course, be adopted by Alak Rajeswari I. Alak Rajeswari I died in 1901 after executing a will by which she gave a life estate in her properties to her daughter, the Maharani of Rewa, and the remainder to the childen of Chitti Babu. On October 28, 1912, Chitti Babu executed a Trust Deed in favour of a trustee for the benefit of his minor son Alak Narayana, subject to payment of maintenance to maintenance holders and payments due to his creditors. On December 14, 1912, the Maharani of Rewa died, but before her death, she had executed a will bequeathing all properties to Chitti Babu for life and the remainder in equal shares to Alak Narayana and his younger brother Vijayananda Gajapathi Raj. During Chitti Babu s life-time the Impartible Estates Acts passed by the Madras Legislature in 1902, 1903 and 1904 came into force. Chitti Babu died on September 11, 1922. On his death, Alak Narayana succeeded to the estate.
2. In 1935, the Vizianagaram Estate and the other properties belonging to Alak Narayana went under the management of the Court of Wards and continued to be in such management till they were handed over to Alak narayana s son Viziaram Gajapathi Raj, the present plaintiff, in 1946, Alak Narayana having died on October 25, 1937. During the time that the estate was being managed by the Court of Wards, Vijayananda Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 3 made a claim before the Court of Wards for his half share in all the properties of Chitti Babu except the impartible estate. The Court of Wards referred this claim to Sir D Arcy Reilly, a retired Judge of the Madras High Court for enquiry. Sir D Arcy accordingly held an enquiry and submitted his report to the Court of Wards. Thereafter the claim of defendant No. 3 was settled by compromise and on October 9, 1944, defendant No. 3 executed a deed of release in favour of the plaintiff and Visweswar Gajapathi Raj, defendant No. 1 who were then represented by the Court of Wards. Under the
