Judgment

SHAH, J. :- On May 5, 1964 the respondents hereinafter called the plaintiffs - instituted in the High Court of Mysore an action in the nature of a passing off action against the appellants hereinafter called the defendants -- for a declaration that they are "exclusive owners of the trade mark consisting of the letters R.S.F. and No. 806", for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from passing off their washing soap as the goods of the plaintiffs and for incidental reliefs.

2. By S. 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958 a passing of action whether the trade mark is registered or unregistered may be instituted in any Court not inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. It appears that on May 5, 1964 the District Court of Mysore, within the territorial limits of which the cause of action was alleged to have arisen, was closed for the summer vacation, and it is common ground that on that day there was no Judge functioning in the District Court who was on duty and competent to exercise the powers of the District Court. At the request of the plaintiffs the High Court entertained the plaint and also an application for interim injunction restraining "the defendants, their agents or servants from using the trade mark R.S.F. on washing soap manufactured by them and from selling washing soap bearing the said offending mark pending disposal of the case. " By order dated May, 29, 1964 the High Court granted the temporary injunction in terms of the prayer in the application.

3. In this appeal with special leave, counsel for the defendants argues that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action instituted by the plaintiffs and had no power to make an order issuing a temporary injunction. The action, as framed, could properly be instituted in the District Court. The expression "District Court" has by virtue of S. 2(e) of Act 43 of 1958 the meaning assigned to that expression in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 2(4) of the Code defines a "district" as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal civil Court - called the District Court - and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. If, therefore, a High Court is possessed of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would, when exercising that jurisdiction be included, for the purpose of Act 43 of 1958, in the expression "District Court".

4. Exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court of Mysore is governed by Mysore Act 5 of 1962. The Act is purely a regulatory Act enacted for regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court in relation to the administration of justice; it does not purport to confer upon the High Court any jurisdiction original or appellate. It is true that by S. 12 of the Mysore High Court Act 1 of 1884 enacted by the Maharaja of Mysore to amend the constitution of the High Court of Mysore and to provide for the administration of justice by that Court, the Government of Mysore was authorised by notification to invest the High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a District Court in all suits of a civil nature exercisable within such local limits as the Government may from time to time declare and appoint in that behalf. But S. 12 of the Mysore Act 1 of 1884 has been repealed by S. 14 of Mysore Act 5 of 1962.

5. The High Court of Mysore is by its constitution primarily a Court exercising appellate jurisdiction; it is competent to exercise original jurisdiction only in those matters in respect of which by special Acts it has been specifically invested with jurisdiction. The High Court is competent to exercise original jurisdiction under S. 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958 if it is invested with the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a District Court, and not otherwise, and the High Court of Mysore not being invested by any statute or under its constitution with that jurisdiction w