The court's jurisdiction to determine the compensation amount in a land acquisition case arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Officer.

Judgment

MUDHOLKAR, J. : This is an appeal against: the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which it reduced the amount of compensation awarded to the appellants by the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in respect of certain lands belonging to them which were acquired by the State.

2. The lands in question are survey Nos. 281/2, 339/1 to 8 and 338/1 to 3 which are situated at a short distance from the town of Vijayawada and lie alongside the Vijayawada- Eluru Road. The Land Acquisition Officer had fixed Rs. 3,500/- per acre for the first two of these survey Nos. and Rs. 4,000/- per acre for the third survey, number. The learned Subordinate Judge granted a uniform rate of Rs. 10,000/- per acre for the lands comprised in all the survey numbers. There were some disputes with regard to the entitlement to the compensation for survey No. 339/1 to 3 and the Land Acquisition officer, therefore, made a reference to the Court for the apportionment of the compensation amount among the various claimants. Six of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition officer and made applications in writing to him within the time allowed by law for referring the matter for determination of the court. It is common ground that no reference was made by the Land Acquisition Officer in pursuance of these applications. When the matter came up before the Court it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it by the Land Acquisition officer was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but was also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection was, however, raised on behalf of the State that in, the absence of any reference upon the applications of six of the appellants the Court was incompetent to deal with that matter. When the matter went up before the High Court by way of an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, the Government pleader raised the question that in the absence of a reference on the question of quantum of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Court had no jurisdiction to consider that matter at all. The High Court, though it ultimately reversed the finding of the court as to the amount of compensation, unfortunately allowed the plea to be raised before it but ultimately upon a consideration of certain decisions, negatived it. We say unfortunately because this is not a kind at plea which the state ought at all to have taken. Quite clearly applications objecting to the rates at which compensation was allowed were taken in time by persons interested in the lands which were under acquisition and it was no fault of theirs that a reference was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer. Indeed, whenever applications are made under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference unless there is a valid ground for rejecting the applications such as for instance that the applications were barred by time. Where an officer of the state is remiss in the performance of his duties in fairness the State ought not to take advantage of this fact. We are further of the opinion that the High Court, after the plea had been raised, would have been well-advised to adjourn the matter for enabling the appellants before us, who were respondents in the High Court, to take appropriate steps for compelling the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference.

3. All the same since the point, was permitted to be urged before it by the High Court and has been raised before us on behalf of the state it is necessary to decide it. On behalf of the appellants it was contended before the High Court that by reason of the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference the State must be deemed to have waived the point. The High Court accepted this argument upon the view that this was not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and that the defect in the procedure was such as could be waived. In ou