SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH AID S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
The Sawtram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd., Akola, Appellants
Versus
Baliram Ukandaji and another, Respondents.
Babu Lal, Intervener.
Civil Appeal No. 525 of 1964.
Advocates appeared
M/s. A. S. Bobde, G. L. Sanghi and Sardar Bahadur, Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. Janardhan Sharma, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1.
M/s. H. W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocates, for Intervener.
Key Points: - The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applies to lay-off compensation under Chapter V-A, not the CP & Berar Act (!) (!) . - Section 33-C empowers a workman to recover money due under Chapter V-A via certificates issued to the Collector, enabling recovery as arrears of land revenue; disputes for such money go before the appropriate Government or its delegate (Second Labour Court) (!) (!) (!) . - Section 31 (1956 Amendment) clarifies that the CP & Berar Act cannot override the provision for lay-off compensation; lay-off matters must be decided under Chapter V-A and Section 33-C, with Government/delegate handling recoveries (!) (!) (!) . - The Court held that calculating the amount of lay-off compensation can be ascertainable from muster rolls and simple arithmetic, and the Labour Court may determine the amount even if exact sums are not predetermined at the outset (!) . - Appeal dismissed; the Mills failed to show CP & Berar Act could govern lay-off disputes; Second Labour Court should adjudicate promptly (!) . - The decision references precedent on recovery and computation under Section 33-C (Kays Construction Co. case) supporting calculable claims based on muster rolls (!) .
Judgement
HIDAYATULLAH, J. : In this appeal by certificate against the judgment of the Bombay High Court, dated August 25, 1962 the appellant is the Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd., Akola, and the respondents two of the workmen of the Mills. The respondents are claiming from the Mills compensation for lay off from March 5, 1960 to October 22, 1960. The proceedings were commenced by an application to the Second Labour Court, Bombay, under S. 33C (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947). The Mills objected on various grounds including firstly that the Second Labour Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case as the dispute fell to be tried under the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act, 1947 and, secondly, that the application under S. 33C, in any event, was incompetent. The Second Labour Court held against the Mills on both the grounds. The Mills applied to the High Court of Bombay under Arts, 226 and 227 of the constitution but by the judgement under appeal their application was dismissed. It may be pointed out here the there were similar applications for compensation for lay off by the other workmen of the Mills and on this preliminary point they were all heard together.
2. In this Court only these two grounds were urged. The contention on behalf of the Mills on the first ground was two-fold. The Mills attempted to establish that the dispute could not be tried under the Central Act but only under the C. P. and Berar Act and further that even if the Central Act applied the calculation of the amount could not be made under S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act as that required proceedings other than those contemplated by that section.
3. The Industrial Disputes Act was passed in 1947 and was brought into force on April 1, 1947. It is not disputed that it applied to the Textile Industry. The C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act 23 of 1946) came into force on June 2, 1947 but only the first section was then brought into force. Later, the remaining sections were brought into force by a notification dated November 20, 1947 in all industries except the Textile Industry. From March 1, 1951, the Act was also made applicable to the Textile Industry . In 1953 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953. The changes material to our purpose were the addition of two definitions and a new chapter in the Act. Previous to the Act there was an Ordinance which the Act replaced but as nothing turns upon the existence of the Ordinance we need not refer to it. The two definitions introduced in S. 2 of the parent Act were:
"(kkk) lay-off (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the break-down of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched:
Explanation - Every workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of the industrial establishment and who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time appointed for the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given employment by the employer within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed to have been laid off for that day within the meaning of this clause:
Provided, * * * *
* * * * *"
and S. 2(oo) retrenchment . The definition of retrenchment need not be quoted there because no question has been raised about retrenchment in this case, Section 3 of the 1953 Amendment Act inserted Chapter V-A headed "Lay Off and Retrenchment" Section 25C gave a right to a workman to ask for compensation if laid off, provided he fulfilled certain conditions. It is not necessary to go into those conditions here. Section 25J then provided as follows:
"25J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter-
(1) The prov
Referred to : Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U. P.
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