The High Court has the jurisdiction to revise the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant, as it was a finding of fact touching the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer.

Headnote:
MADRAS CULTIVATING TENANTS PROTECTION ACT, 1955 - S. 3 (3) - REVISION - JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT - FINDING OF FACT BY REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER - WHETHER SUBJECT TO REVISION BY HIGH COURT.
Fact of the Case:

The respondent, claiming to be the cultivating tenant of the appellant, deposited rent in the Revenue Court under S. 3 (3) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The Revenue Court held that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant and dismissed the application. The High Court, on revision, set aside the order and declared that the amount deposited represented the correct rent due.
Finding of the Court:

The High Court had the jurisdiction to revise the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant, as it was a finding of fact touching the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer.
Issues: Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to revise the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant.
Ratio Decidendi: The Revenue Divisional Officer is an inferior Court of limited jurisdiction functioning under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The existence of the relation of landlord and cultivating tenant between the contending parties is the essential condition for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Revenue Divisional Officer in all proceedings under the Act. The Tribunal can exercise its jurisdiction under the Act only if such relationship exists. If the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is challenged, it must enquire into the existence of the preliminary fact and decide if it has jurisdiction. But its decision on the existence of this preliminary fact is not final; such a decision is subject to review by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under S. 6-B. The enquiry by the Tribunal is summary, there is no provision for appeal form its decision, and the legislature could not have intended that its decision on this preliminary fact involving a question of title would be final and not subject to the overriding powers of revision by the High Court.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs.

Judgement

BACHAWAT, J.: On April 24, 1958, the respondent claiming to be the cultivating tenant of the appellant in respect of certain lands in Manapparavai Vattam, Nannilam Taluk deposited Rs. 462 as rent for 1367 fasli in the Revenue Court (the Court of the Revenue Divisional Officer), Tanjore under S. 3 (3) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (Madras Act No. 25 of 1955) and filed an application before the Court praying for a declaration that the amount deposited represented the correct amount of rent due from him. The appellant denied that the respondent was his cultivating tenant. On July 31, 1958, the Revenue Court, Tanjore held that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant of the appellant and could not claim the benefit of S. 3 (3) and dismissed the application. The respondent filed a petition in revision before the Madras High Court under S. 6-B of the Ac read with S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was a cultivating tenant of the appellant and by its order, dated March 27, 1959, allowed the revision petition and declared that the amount deposited by the respondent represented the correct amount due from him to the appellant. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave.

2. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of the Revenue Court that the respondent was not a cultivating tenant was a finding of fact and the High Court had no jurisdiction to set it aside on revision. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent submitted that the finding was in respect of a collateral fact upon the existence of which the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court under S. 3 (3) depended and the High Court had ample power to revise the finding under S. 6-B of the Act. Section 6-B is in the these terms:

The Revenue Divisional Officer shall be deemed to be a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), and his orders shall be liable to revision by the High Court under the provisions of that section.

3. Section 6-B empowers the High Court to revise the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and for the purposes of the section, the Officer is deemed to be a subordinate Court. Section 115 is in these terms:

The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears-

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.

4. In the present case, no question of revision under Sub-s. (c) of S. 115 arises, and we are concerned only with the power of revision under sub-ss. (a) and (b) of Section 115. Sub-section (a) empowers the High Court to correct an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction; sub-s. (b) empowers it to correct an erroneous refusal of jurisdiction. The decision of the subordinate Court on all questions of law and fact not touching its jurisdiction is final and, however, erroneous such a decision may be, it is not revisable under subs-ss. (a) and (b) of S. 115. On the other hand, if by an erroneous decision on a question of fact or law touching its jurisdiction, e. g., on a preliminary fact upon the existence on which its jurisdiction depends, the subordinate Court assumes a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, its decision is not final, and is subject to review by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under sub-ss. (a) and (b) of S. 115. The question is, on which side of the line the present case lies, and whether the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer that the respondent is not a cultivating

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