1. Detention under Defence of India Rules to prevent activities prejudicial to essential supplies — Challenge to validity of detention order under Article 32 of the Constitution. (Para 2 )
Back
Next 
1966 Supreme(SC) 62
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.
G. Sadanandan, Petitioner
Versus
State of Kerala and another, Respondents.
Writ Petn. No. 136 of 1965.
Advocates appeared
M/s. M. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and D. P. Singh Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi, and Co., for Petitioner; Mr. Niren De, Addl. Solicitor-General of India, (M/s. A. C. Pudissery and M. R. Krishna Pillai, Advocates with him), for Respondents.
Advocates:
D.P.Singh, M.K.RAMAMURTHY, M.R.Krishna Pillai, NIREN DEY, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL
D.P.Singh, M.K.RAMAMURTHY, M.R.Krishna Pillai, NIREN DEY, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL
Detention orders based on subjective satisfaction are generally not judicially reviewable, but can be set aside if proven mala fide or passed without application of mind, especially when the authority fails to provide sufficient evidence to refute prima facie allegations of malice.
Headnote:(A) Defence of India Rules, 1962 - Rule 30(1)(b) - Constitution of India - Articles 32 and 352 - Detention order - Subjective satisfaction of the authority - Judicial scrutiny - Limited scope - While the merits of a detention order are generally not open to judicial scrutiny, orders can be set aside if they suffer from serious infirmities, are passed mala fide, or are issued without proper application of mind. (Paras 13, 14)
(B) Mala fides - Where a prima facie case is established that detention is mala fide or the result of a casual approach by the authority, the appropriate authority must place sufficient material before the Court via a proper affidavit to demonstrate that such allegations are not well-founded. (Para 20)
(C) Malicious reports - Malice attributable to a reporting authority is not automatically attributed to the detaining authority, provided the detaining authority carefully examined the report and considered all relevant material before passing the order. (Para 19)
Facts of the case:
A businessman was detained under emergency rules to prevent activities prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies. The petitioner alleged that the detention was mala fide, orchestrated by a police officer to eliminate him from the wholesale business for the benefit of the officer's relatives. The petitioner was arrested immediately after being granted bail by a magistrate. Subsequently, a control order came into force requiring a license for the trade; since the petitioner had no license, he argued that continued detention to prevent prejudicial activities in that trade was unjustified.
Findings of Court:
The detention order and its continuation were characterized as mala fide and an abuse of power. This conclusion was based on the failure of the police officer to deny specific allegations on oath and the defective, vague, and hearsay-based nature of the affidavit filed by the government.
Issues: Whether the detention order was passed mala fide and whether the continued detention of the petitioner after the implementation of a control order restricting the trade was justified.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that while the merits of a detention order based on subjective satisfaction are generally not open to judicial review, the court can intervene in cases of mala fides. The lack of a specific denial by the officer accused of malice, combined with the illogical justification for continuing detention after the trade became legally restricted, established that the power was abused.
Result: Petition allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner alleges mala fide detention based on false reports to benefit trade rivals — State contends detention was bona fide to maintain essential community supplies. (Para 11 , 12 )
3. Failure of the accused officer to deny allegations and the defective, vague nature of the state's affidavit indicate mala fides and non-application of mind. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 )
4. Detention orders passed mala fide or without application of mind are invalid, particularly when the detaining authority fails to refute allegations of malice with sufficient material. (Para 14 , 20 )
5. Petition allowed — Detention order declared invalid and unjustified — Petitioner directed to be released with costs. (Para 1 , 20 , 21 )
6. What is the scope of judicial review for detention orders passed under the Defence of India Rules during a proclaimed Emergency?
While the merits of subjective satisfaction and fundamental rights under Articles 19, 20, and 21 are generally barred from scrutiny, the court can examine statutory safeguards and set aside orders that are mala fide or passed without proper application of mind. (Para 13 , 14 )
7. What is the legal significance when a public officer specifically accused of malice in a detention matter fails to file a counter-affidavit?
The failure of an impleaded officer to deny specific and clear allegations of malice on oath constitutes a serious infirmity in the state's case and supports a finding of mala fides. (Para 15 )
8. Can a detention order based on prejudicial business activities be justified if a subsequent law makes that business illegal without a license?
No; continuing detention on the ground of prejudicial business activities after a Control Order makes such trade illegal without a license is unjustified and may be characterized as mala fide. (Para 18 )
9. What is the requirement for the detaining authority when a prima facie case of mala fides is established by the detenu?
The appropriate authority must place sufficient material before the court via a proper affidavit by a duly authorized person to demonstrate that the allegations of mala fides or casual decision-making are not well-founded. (Para 20 )
Judgement
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.: This petition was heard on the 11th February, 1966; and at the close of the hearing, we allowed the petition and directed that the petitioner should be released forthwith and indicated that our reasons would be pronounced later. Accordingly, our present judgment gives our reasons for the order which has already been passed by us.
2. The petitioner, G. Sadanandan, has been detained by respondent No. 1, the State of Karala, under Rule 30 (1) (b) of the DEFENCE OF INDIA RULES . 1962 (hereinafter called "the Rules") by an order passed by it on the 20th October, 1965. The said order recites that from the materials placed before respondent No. 1 it was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it was necessary to detain him. The said order further shows that under Rule 30 (4) of the Rules, respondent No. 1 had decided that the petitioner be detained in the Central Prison, Trivandrum, under conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment of offences and breaches of discipline as provided in the Travancore-Cochin Security Prisoners Order, 1950. The petitioner challenges the validity of this order by his present petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.
3. The petitioner is a businessman who carries on wholesale business in kersene oil as ESSO dealer and in provisions in his places of business at Trivandrum. In connection with his wholesale business of selling kerosene oil, the petitioner receives kersosene oil either in bulk or in sealed tins from the ESSO company. When the kerosene oil is thus received by him, the petitioner transfers the kerosene oil from barrels into empty tins purchased from the market and sells them to his customers. Until the Kerala Kersene Control Order, 1965 was promulgated, and brought into force on the 24th October, 1965, the petitioner was not required to take a licence for carrying on his business in kerosene oil. As from the 24th October, 1965 the said trade could not be carried on in Kerala without obtaining a licence. It is common ground that the petitioner has not been granted a licence in that behalf. To his present petition, the petitioner has joined respondent No. 1 and N. Paramasivan Nair, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Civil) Supplies Cell, Crime Branch, Trivandrum, as respondent No. 2.
4. The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 2 caused to be initiated criminal proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. 70 of 1965 in the Court of the District Magistrate, Trivandrum. These proceedings were commenced on the 20th May, 1965. The charge against the petitioner set out in the First Information Report was that the petitioner had exhibited a board showing stock "nil" on the 20th May, 1965, at about 7.00 p.m. in his wholesale shop at Chalai, Trivandrum when, in fact, there was stock available in his shop The Police searched the shop that day in the presence of respondent No. 2, though in the relevant papers prepared in regard to the said search, no reference was made to his presence. According to the petitioner, the board indicating nil stock had been exhibited in his shop, because 7 ins out of the available stock had been sold to one. D. N. Siktar in regard to which a sale memo was being prepared when the raid took place, whereas the two remaining this were in a damaged condition and could not have been sold. Even so, the raid was carried out and F.I.R. was lodged against the petitioner alleging that he had committed an offence by violating Rule 125 (2) and (3) of the Rules read with clause 4 of the Kerosene (Price Control) Order, 1963.
5. The petitioner appeared before the District Magistrate before whom the F. I.R. had been filed, and was released by him on bail. In this case, all the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined, except the officer who had submitted the charge-sheet. Except the Sub-Inspector of Po
