The word "building" in S. 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, must be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense and does not include a mere pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side.

Headnote:
U. P. ZAMINDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS ACT, 1951 - S. 9 - BUILDING - INTERPRETATION - BRICK KILN - WHETHER A BUILDING - HELD, NO.
Fact of the Case:

The dispute arose from a suit filed by the respondents, owners of a brick kiln, against the appellant, the lessee of the kiln, for recovery of arrears of rent. The appellant claimed that the brick kiln vested in the State under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 (Act 1 of 1951), and therefore, the respondents were not entitled to claim rent. The trial court held that the brick kiln did not vest in the State and granted a decree for 1/3rd of the rent claimed. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and held that the brick kiln was a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act and the entire area of the land vested in the State. The respondents appealed to the Supreme Court.
Finding of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the brick kiln was not a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act. The Court observed that the word "building" has not been defined in the Act and must be construed in its ordinary grammatical sense. The Court referred to the definition of "building" in Webster's New International Dictionary and noted that a building is a fabric or edifice designed to stand more or less permanently and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for beasts, or some other useful purpose. The Court held that the brick kiln in question did not meet this definition as it had no site, no roof, and was merely a pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side.
Issues: Whether the brick kiln was a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the brick kiln was not a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act because it did not meet the ordinary grammatical definition of a building. The Court noted that the brick kiln had no site, no roof, and was merely a pit dug in the ground with bricks by its side. The Court also observed that the question of what constitutes a "building" under S. 9 of the Act is a question of degree, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Final Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the suit filed by the respondents.

Judgment

RAMASWAMI, J. : The question of law involved in these appeals is whether the disputed brick kiln on plots Nos. 596 and 597 in Mauza Sarwat, Pargana and District Muzaffarnagar and leased out to the appellant is a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U. P. Act 1 of 1951).

2. The respondents are the owners of a brick kiln located on the two plots Nos. 596 and 597 in Mauza Sarwat, Pargana and District Muzaffarnagar. They leased out the brick kiln to the appellant under a registered lease deed, dated December 29, 1950. The lease was to take effect from January 1, 1951 and terminate on September 30, 1953. The rent was fixed at Rs. 41 per mensem payable annually in the month of October. The rent for the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953 remained due against the appellant. The respondents filed a suit (No. 1125 of 1953) in the Court of Munsif Muzaffarnagar for the recovery of Rs. 492 being arrears of rent from October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953. The suit was contested by the appellant who pleaded that after the passing of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U. P. Act 1 of 1951)-hereinafter called the Act -the plots of land had vested in the State of U. P. under S. 6 of the Act with effect from July 1, 1952 and the respondents were, therefore, not entitled to claim any rent from the appellant. By his judgment, dated February 12, 1955 the Additional Munsif, Muzaffarnagar, held that the brick kiln did not vest in the State and as it occupied only 1/3rd of the total area of the land, the respondents were entitled to a decree for 1/3rd of the rent claimed. The Munsif accordingly granted a decree for a sum of Rs. 164 and dismissed the balance of the claim of the respondents. Against the judgment of the Additional Munsif both the parities filed appeals before the District Judge. Both the appeals were disposed of by the Civil Judge of Muzaffarnagar by a common judgment, dated August 19, 1957. It was held by the Additional Civil Judge that the brick kiln could not be regarded as a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act and the entire area of the two plots Nos. 596 and 597 had vested in the State. The Additional Civil Judge accordingly allowed the appellant s appeal and dismissed the appeal of the respondents. The net result was that the suit of the respondents for arrears of rent was dismissed as a whole. Against the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge the respondents filed two Second Appeals Nos. 2510 and 2511 of 1957 to the High Court. The High Court held that the brick kiln was a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act and the title to the two plots of land did not vest in the State and the respondents acquired the rights of statutory tenants under S. 9 of the Act and they had a right to demand rent from the appellant under the terms of the lease. The High Court accordingly allowed both the Second Appeals and granted a decree to the respondents for the entire amount of rent claimed.

3. Section 4 of the Act deals with the acquisition of the interests of intermediaries. The section provides as follows:

"4. (1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act the State Government may, by notification, declare that as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and, as from the beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest, except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances.

(2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-s. (1) in respect only of such area or areas as may be specified and all the provisions of sub-s. (1) shall be applicable to and in the case of every such notification."

Section 6 (a) sets out the consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State. Section 6 (a) reads

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