Judgment

SARKAR, J. : The respondents are the owners of the certain premises in Connaught Circus in New Delhi, which were let out to Allen Berry and Co. (Calcutta) Ltd. Sometime in 1959 Allen Berry and Co. transferred the lease to the appellant and put the latter in possession. Alleging that the transfer had been made without their consent, the respondents made an application under Cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to the Controller appointed under it against Allen Berry and Co. and the appellant for an order for recovery of possession of the premises from them. While the application was pending, Allen Berry and Co. went into liquidation and was in due course dissolved and its name was, thereupon, struck off from the records of the proceedings. The Controller later heard the application and made an order in favour of the respondents for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant also. An appeal by the appellant to the Rent Control Tribunal under the Act against this order was dismissed. The appellant then moved the High Court of Punjab for setting aside the order of the Tribunal, but there also it was unsuccessful. It has now come to this Court in further appeal.

2. It was contended that the order for recovery of possession made against the appellant after Allen Berry and Co. had ceased to be a party to the proceedings, was incompetent. This contention was based on an interpretation of the terms of sub-s. (1) of S. 14, material part of which is set out below :

Section 14. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant :

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :-

(a) .......................

(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord.

3. The contention of the appellant was put in this way : The first part of sub-s. (1) of S. 14 puts a complete ban on recovery of possession from all tenants. The proviso to it is only an excepting clause and it lifts that ban in the circumstances mentioned in it. It follows that the proviso, though it does not expressly mention tenants, permits orders for recovery of possession against them alone. The tenant in Cl. (b) of the proviso means only the tenant sought to be evicted under the proviso such tenant having also to be by the express terms of the clause, a tenant who has assigned his tenancy. This follows from the use of the article "the" before the word "tenant" there. Therefore, the only person against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made under Cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 14 is the tenant who has assigned his tenancy. No such order can, hence, be made against the person to whom the tenancy has been assigned. As the appellant was such a person, no order for eviction could be made against it. I wish to observe at once that if this contention is correct - which I do not think it is - then the order could never be made against the appellant and the fact that Allen Berry and Co. ceased to be a party to the proceedings made no difference in this regard.

4. The argument of the appellant is really based on the article "the" prefixed to the word "tenant" in Cl. (b) of the proviso. It is said that the article clearly indicates that the only person against whom an order for ejectment can be made under Cl. (b) is the tenant who assigns or sub-lets or parts with possession of the tenancy without the landlord s consent. I am unable to accept this argument. The proviso expressly states that an order for ejectm