1. Landlord sought possession of land after tenancy determination under Berar Act 1951, amidst subsequent enactment of Tenancy Act 1958 and conflicting provisions on pending proceedings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )
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1965 Supreme(SC) 192
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.I., K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ
Ramchandra, Appellant
Versus
Tukaram and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 616 of 1963.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. Patwardhan, Senior Advocate, (Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Advocate, and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellant. Mr. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocate, for Respondent.
Advocates:
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, G.L.SANGHI, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, Ravindra Narayan, S.G.PATVARDHAN,
A.G.Ratnaparkhi, G.L.SANGHI, J.B.DADACHAN, O.C.MATHUR, Ravindra Narayan, S.G.PATVARDHAN,
Rights acquired under a repealed tenancy act remain enforceable. Procedural requirements of a repealing act apply to pending proceedings, but substantive conditions for terminating a tenancy under the new act do not apply to rights of possession already acquired under the previous law.
Headnote:(A) Tenancy Act - Sections 36, 38 and 132 - Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act - Sections 8, 9 and 19 - Repeal and Saving Clause - Enforcement of rights acquired under repealed legislation - Whether procedural transition to a new Act imposes new substantive conditions on rights already acquired - The expression "shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act" in the saving clause refers to procedural provisions and not to the conditions precedent for the institution of fresh proceedings (Paras 6, 7).
(B) Tenancy Act - Section 38 - Termination of tenancy for personal cultivation - Prospective application - Section 38 authorizes a landlord to obtain possession if the land is bona fide required for personal cultivation, subject to specific notices and conditions - Such provisions are prospective and do not purport to affect rights acquired before the date the Act came into force (Paras 7, 8).
(C) Tenancy Act - Section 38(3) and (4) - Restrictions on termination - These restrictions apply to tenancies determined under Section 38(1) - Where a tenancy has already been determined under a repealed Act, the restrictions and conditions of the new Act's termination provisions are inapplicable (Paras 8, 9).
Facts of the case:
A landlord obtained an order for the termination of a tenancy on the ground of bona fide requirement for personal cultivation under a repealed agricultural leases act. Following the enactment of a new tenancy act which repealed the previous legislation, the landlord applied for the restoration of possession. The lower authorities and the High Court held that while the requirement for a fresh notice under the new act did not apply, the substantive conditions and restrictions regarding personal cultivation under the new act were applicable to the application for possession.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the right to obtain possession was acquired under the repealed act before the new act came into force. Under the saving clause of the new act, rights, titles, and interests acquired before its commencement remained enforceable. The requirement that pending proceedings be disposed of "in accordance with the provisions" of the new act relates to the competence of officers and the procedure of the trial, not to the imposition of new substantive conditions for the termination of the tenancy.
Issues: Whether the conditions and restrictions prescribed under the new tenancy act for terminating a tenancy for personal cultivation apply to proceedings initiated to enforce a right of possession already acquired under a repealed act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that Section 38 of the new act is prospective and governs the termination of tenancies under that specific act. It does not affect rights already acquired under the repealed law. The transition clause in the saving section attracts the procedural framework of the new act but does not make the substantive conditions or restrictions of Section 38 applicable to a tenancy that had already been determined under the previous legislation.
Result: Order modified and matter remanded to the authority to deal with the application as an enforcement of rights under the repealed act, with the provisions of Section 38 of the new act having no application thereto.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether an application for possession based on a prior determination under the Berar Act must satisfy the conditions and restrictions prescribed under Section 38 of the Tenancy Act. (Para 5 )
3. Section 132(3) of the Tenancy Act attracts procedural provisions for pending proceedings but does not impose conditions precedent for fresh proceedings or override acquired rights. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 )
4. Prospective conditions for terminating tenancy under a new Act do not apply to the enforcement of rights already acquired under a repealed Act. (Para 7 , 10 )
5. Matter remanded to Tahsildar to enforce rights under the Berar Act, holding that Section 38 of the Tenancy Act is inapplicable. (Para 11 )
6. Does the requirement to dispose of pending proceedings in accordance with a new Act include satisfying conditions precedent for fresh proceedings?
No. The court held that such a requirement attracts the procedural provisions of the new Act but does not impose conditions precedent for the institution of fresh proceedings, as doing so would undermine rights already acquired under previous laws. (Para 6 , 7 )
7. Does Section 38 of the Tenancy Act apply to the enforcement of a right to possession acquired under the Berar Act?
No. Section 38 is prospective and authorizes landlords to terminate tenancies under specific conditions; it does not affect rights to possession already acquired before the Tenancy Act came into force. (Para 7 , 10 )
8. Do the restrictions and conditions in Sections 38(3) and 38(4) of the Tenancy Act apply to all tenancy terminations?
No. These provisions are part of an integrated scheme applying specifically to tenancies determined under Section 38(1). They do not apply where the tenancy was determined under a different law or provision. (Para 8 , 9 )
Judgment
SHAH, J. : The first respondent Tukaram was a protected lessee with the meaning of that expression in the BERAR REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL LEASES ACT 24 of 1951 - hereinafter called "the Berar Act" in respect of certain land at Mouza Karwand in the Vidarbha Region (now in the State of Maharashtra). The appellant - who is the owner of the land - served a notice under S. 9(1) of the Berar Act terminating the tenancy on the ground that he required the land for personal cultivation, and submitted an application to the Revenue Officer under S. 8 (1) of the Berar Act terminating the tenancy on the ground he required the land for personal cultivation, and submitted an application to the Revenue Officer under S. 8 (1) (1) (g) of the Berar Act for an order determining the tenancy. The Revenue Officer determined the tenancy by order dated July 2, 1957 and made it effective from April 1, 1958. In the meantime the Governor of the State of Bombay (the Vidarbha region having been incorporated within the State of Bombay by the States Reorganisation Act 1956) issued Ordinance 4 of 1957 which was later replaced by Act 9 of 1958 known as the Bombay Vidarbha Region Agricultural Tenants (Protection from Eviction and Amendment of Tenancy Laws) Act, 1957. By S. 3 of Act 9 of 1958 a ban was imposed against eviction of tenants, and by S. 4 all proceedings pending at the date of the commencement of the Act, or which may be instituted during the period of the Act remained in force, for termination of any tenancy and for eviction of tenants were to be stayed on certain conditions set out in that section. Bombay Act 9 of 1958 and the Berar Act 24 of 1951 were repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 99 of 1958, which may hereinafter be referred to as "the Tenancy Act". The appellant applied on May 15, 1958 to the Naib Tahsildar, Chikli for an order for "restoration of possession" of the land. By order dated August 2, 1960 the Naib Tahsildar ordered "restoration of possession of the land" to the appellant. In appeal the Sub-Divisional Officer, buldana set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar because in his view the application was not maintainable in that the appellant had failed to comply with the requirements of S. 38 of the Tenancy Act. The Revenue Tribunal confirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional officer. The appellant then moved the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying for a writ of direction quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Buldana and for the Revenue Tribnal and for an order for restoration of possession of the land in pursuance of the order of Naib Tahsildar. The High Court set aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Revenue Tribunal and remanded the case to the Tahsildar for dealing with the application made by the appellant in the light of the directions given in the judgment. The appellant appeals to this Court, with certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court.
2. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court should have restored the order passed by the Naib Tahsildar and should not have reopened the inquiry as directed in its judgment. It is necessary in the first instance to make a brief survey of the diverse statutory provisions in their relation to the progress of the dispute, which have a bearing on the question which falls to be determined. The land was originally in the Vidarbha region which before the Bombay Reorgination Act, 1956 was a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the tenancy of the land was governed by the Berar Act. The first respondent was a protected lessee in respect of the land under S. 3 of the Berar Act. Section 8 of the Act imposed restrictions on termination of protected leases. It was provided that notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a Court of law, the lease of any land held by a protected lessee shall not be term
