Judgment

WANCHOO, J. : This appeal on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court raises the question of interpretation of Section 82 (b) of the Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts necessary for present purposes are these. In the election to the U. P. Legislative Assembly from Dehra Dun City constituency in 1962, Brij Bhushan Saran respondent was one of the candidates and was declared elected. One Raturi Vaid was another candidate at the same election. He however withdrew his candidature within the time fixed for withdrawal. He belonged to the same party as the returned candidate and worked for him. After the election, an election petition was filed by two electors praying that the election of Brij Bhushan Saran be set aside, and one of the grounds with which alone we are concerned in the present appeal was that Raturi Vaid had threatened an elector after the date of his withdrawal from the candidature that the elector s bones would be broken if he did not cast his vote for Brij Bhushan Saran and also did not work for him and persuade others to vote for him. The Election Tribunal held that this amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123(2) read with the proviso (a) (i) thereof. It further held that as this corrupt practice was committed by a candidate, namely, Raturi Vaid, it was necessary to join him as respondent to the petition. As this was not done, the Tribunal dismissed the petition under S. 90(3) of the Act.

2. Thereupon there was an appeal to the High Court, which upheld the view taken by the Tribunal. The High Court however granted a certificate to appeal to this Court; and that is how the matter has come before us.

3. It is not in dispute now that the allegation made with respect to the conduct of Raturi Vaid would amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123(2) of the Act. What is however contended is firstly that there was no allegation of corrupt practice against Raturi Vaid, and secondly that even if that was so, Raturi Vaid could not come within the meaning of the words "any other candidate" used in S. 82(b) inasmuch as he withdrew his candidature as provided in S. 37 of the Act.

4. We are of opinion that there is no force in the first contention raised on behalf of the appellants. There is no doubt that the allegation was that it was Raturi Vaid who gave the threat, though it was alleged that he did so in furtherance of the election of Brij Bhushan Saran and on his behalf. Whatever may be the effect of such a threat held out by Raturi Vaid on the election of Brij Bhushan Saran, the primary allegation certainly was that it was Raturi Vaid who had committed the corrupt practice, though Brij Bhushan Saran was also alleged to be party to it and therefore liable for the consequences. In these circumstances it is impossible to accept that the allegation of corrupt practice was only against Brij Bhushan Saran and not against Raturi Vaid. As we have said already, the primary allegation was against Raturi Vaid, though Brij Bhushan Saran was also made liable for the corrupt practice alleged to be committed by Raturi Vaid on the ground that it was done on his behalf and in furtherance of his election. It must therefore be held that there was an allegation of corrupt practice against Raturi Vaid in this case.

5. This brings us to the main question raised in the present appeal, namely, whether Raturi Vaid can be said to be "any other candidate " within the meaning of those words in S. 82(b). In this connection, the appellants rely on a decision of the Patna High Court in Kapildeo Singh v. Suraj Narayan Singh, AIR 1959 Pat 250 which certainly is in their favour. That decision however has not been accepted by the Allahahad High Court which took the view that even though Raturi Vaid might have withdrawn his candidature under S. 37 of the Act, he would certainly be covered by the words "any other candidate" in S. 82 (b).

6. The word "ca