The principles of natural justice are not violated when a statutory procedure is fully complied with and the party affected does not demand a personal hearing or an opportunity to produce materials in support of its explanation.

Judgement

WANCHOO, J. : This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Assam High Court. The appellant is the State of Assam and the respondent is the Gauhati Municipal Board hereinafter referred to as the Board). After the municipal election, new members of the Board began to function from July 7, 1962. The term of the members is four years and would in the normal course have expired on July 6, 1966.On June 9, 1964 the appellant issued notice to the Board under S. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act No. XV of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). That section gives power to the State Government if it is of the opinion that a Board is incompetent to perform or -persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under the Act or otherwise by law, or exceeds or abuses its powers, either to dissolve the Board or to supersede it for a period not exceeding one year at a time, and where dissolution is ordered to order a fresh election as soon as possible. The section further provides that this power can be exercised by the State Government after giving the Board an opportunity for submitting its explanation in regard to the matter in question. On receipt of such explanation the State Government has to consider it and thereafter by notification stating reasons for so doing it may declare that the Board is incompetent to perform or persistently makes default in the performance of its duties or has exceeded or abused its powers. The State Government may by such notification either dissolve the Board or supersede it as already indicated.

2. The State Government issued notice to the Board on June 9, 1964. In this notice the State Government said that it was of the opinion that the Board was incompetent to perform or had persistently made default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under the Act or otherwise by law and that the Board had abused its powers. The notice went on to say that the State Government had come to the tentative conclusion that the Board should be superseded under S. 298 of the Act and asked the Board to show cause why this should not be done. The notice also stated eight charges which were the basis of the tentative conclusion of the State Government and asked the Board to give an explanation in full with respect to these charges. The Board gave the explanation on August 10, 1964. That explanation was apparently considered by the State Government and on December 9, 1964, the State Government issued the notification superseding the Board for one year with effect from December 14, 1964 for reasons which were stated in the notification.

3. Thereupon the Board filed a writ petition in the High Court on December 24, 1964 on various grounds. It is however unnecessary for present purposes to mention all the grounds raised in the writ petition. It is sufficient to say that three of the grounds raised therein were-(i) that in passing the order of supersession the State Government had violated the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Board had been denied the opportunity of being personally heard and of producing evidence, as the proceedings resulting in supersession were quasi judicial proceedings, (ii) that the charges which were found proved in the notification of December 9, 1964 were not the same which were the subject matter of the notice of June 9, 1964, and (iii) that the State Government had already come to the conclusion that the Board should he superseded when it gave notice on June 9, 1964 and had thus pre-judged the issue even before the explanation of the Board had been received.

4. The application was opposed by the appellant, and its case was that proceedings resulting in an order under S. 298 of the Act were administrative proceedings and not quasi-judicial proceedings. In any case even if they were quasi-judicial proceedings, the appellant contended that it had given a hearing to the Board as required by S. 298 and there was no would of the pr