To institute a suit under S. 92, C. P. C., for removal of a Mahant, the plaintiffs must have a direct and substantial interest in the trust property.

Headnote:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 92 - SUIT FOR REMOVAL OF MAHANT - INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS - NIRMALA SADHUS - WHETHER SIKHS - INTEREST OF SIKHS IN GURUDWARA MANAGED BY NIRMALA SADHUS.
Fact of the Case:

Suit under Section 92, C.P.C., for removal of the appellant from the office of the Mahant of a Gurdwara. The plaintiffs claimed that they had an interest in the trust property in their capacity of representatives of the owners of the land situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala. The High Court held that the plaintiffs had an interest as required by S. 92, C. P. C., because they were Sikhs and that the institution was a religious institution of Nirmala Sadhus who were a section of Sikhs.
Finding of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs/respondents, who were merely Lambardars and residents of village Jhandawala, had, in those capacities, no such interest as could entitle them to institute this suit. The Court also held that Nirmala Sadhus are not Sikhs and, consequently , in their mere capacity of followers of Sikh religion residing in village Jhandawala, the plaintiffs/ respondents could not v be held to have such an interest as could entitle them to institute the suit under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiffs/respondents had an interest in the trust property as required by S. 92, C. P. C., to institute the suit for removal of the appellant from the office of the Mahant? 2. Whether Nirmala Sadhus are Sikhs?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The interest required under S. 92, C. P. C., must be a direct and substantial interest in the trust property, and not a mere remote or contingent interest. The plaintiffs/respondents, as Lambardars and residents of village Jhandawala, did not have such an interest. 2. Nirmala Sadhus are not Sikhs. They have deviated from the orthodox Sikh religion and have adopted many of the customs of the Shastras. They are looked on as unorthodox by most true Sikhs.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed with costs. The decree of the High Court was set aside, and the decree passed by the District Judge was restored.

Judgement

BHARGAVA, J. : This appeal under certificate granted by the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh, has been filed by Harnam Singh appellant against a decree passed by the High Court, decreeing a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after setting aside the dismissal of the suit by the District Judge, and removing the appellant from the office of the Mahant of an institution described in the plaint as Gurdwara Jhandawala . The suit was brought by two plaintiffs after obtaining permission from the Advocate-General. One of the plaintiff-respondents, Ishar Singh, died and his legal representatives were not brought on the record. However, in view of the nature of the suit, no objection was raised before us about the maintainability of this appeal on this ground and, consequently, we refrain from dilating on this aspect.

2. The respondents claimed in the plaint that there is one Guru Granth Sahib at village Jhandawala in the name of Gurudwara Jhandanwala which is managed by Mahant Harnam Singh appellant as a Mahatmin, and that he is in possession of the Dera and agricultural land belonging to Guru Granth Sahib, Gurudwara, Jhandawala. The Gurudwara was alleged to be a public religious place which was established by the residents of the village, and it was pleaded that this religious institution was a public trust created by the residents of the village for the service of the Public to provide food to the visitors from the Lungar (free kitchen) to allow the people to fulfil religious beliefs and for worship etc. The plaintiff-respondents stated that, in the capacity of representatives of owners of lands situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala, they submitted an application for permission to institute this suit on the ground that the appellant was indulging in various undesirable activities and was misusing the funds of the trust which justified his removal from the office of the Mahant. The respondents claimed that, in their capacity of representatives of the owners of the land situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala, they were entitled to institute this suit under S.92, C.P.C.

3. The suit was contested by the appellant on various grounds, amongst which the principal one, which we are concerned, is that the plaintiff-respondents had no such interest in this public trust as would entitle them to institute the suit. At the initial stage, the appellant did not admit that there was a public trust in existence at all, but the trial Court held that the institution was a public trust of a religious character; and that finding was not challenged on behalf of the appellant before the High Court. The two principal grounds, on which the dismissal of the suit by the District Judge was sought to be justified before the High Court, were that the plaintiffs-respondents had no right to institute the suit under S. 92, C. P. C., for want of interest in the trust, and that the respondents had failed to prove that the appellant had indulged in any such activities as would justify his removal from the office of the Mahant .

4. In this appeal, we heard learned counsel for the parties on the first question as to whether the plaintiffs-respondents had any such interest in this trust which could entitle them to institute the suit under S. 92 C. P. C. As has been mentioned above, in the plaint the claim was that the plaintiffs were interested in the capacity of representatives of the owners of the land situated at village Jhandawala and of residents of village Jhandawala. On behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents, the pleading was that this Gurdwara was established as a public trust on behalf of the residents of the village, but, during the course of evidence, even the plaintiffs, themselves admitted that, before the residents of the village donated any property at all to this institution, the institution was already in existence. According to the plaintiffs, the institution was then k

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