The inherent power of the High Court to cancel a bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence is preserved by S. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is not violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution.

Judgment

BACHAWAT, J. : The appellant along with other persons is being tried for an offence under S. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 1137 (81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. and S. 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act. 1947. The offence is bailable. The appellant was released on bail under orders of Magistrates, dated May 11, l960 and April 1, 1961. A large number of witnesses have been examined but the trial has not yet been concluded. By an order, dated March 3/6 1967, the High Court of Maharashtra, Bombay, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction cancelled the bail orders and directed him to surrender to his bail. From this order. the- present appeal has been filed by special leave.

2. In Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, 1958 SCR 1226, this Court held that a High Court has the inherent power to cancel a bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence where such an order is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court, and this power is preserved by S. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. On behalf of the appellant it was strenuously argued that this case was wrongly decided. Having heard full arguments, we find no reason for departing from our earlier decision.

4. In the matter of admission to bail, the Code of Criminal Procedure makes a distinction between bailable and non-bailable offences. The grant of bail to a person accused of a non-bailable offence is discretionary under S. 497 of the Code and the person released on bail may again be arrested and committed to custody by an order of the High Court, the Court of Session and the Court granting the bail. Under S. 498 of the Code. the High Court and the Court of Session may release any person on bail and by a subsequent order cause any person so admitted to bail to be arrested and committed to custody. A person accused of a bailable offence is treated differently; at any time while under detention without a warrant and at any stage of the proceedings before the Court before which he is brought, he has the right under S. 496 of the Code to be released on bail. The Code makes no express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted under S. 496. Nevertheless, if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is intimidating, bribing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to absconds the High Court has the power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit. This jurisdiction springs from the over-riding inherent powers of the High Court and can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody. For the reasons given in Talab Haji Hussain s case, 1958 SCR 1226, we hold that this inherent power of the High Court exists and is preserved by S. 561-A of the Code. The person committed to custody under the orders of the High Court cannot ask for his release on bail under S. 496, but the High Court may by a subsequent- order admit him to bail again.

5. Counsel for the appellant argued that the inherent power of the High Court is not conferred by any legislation or statute and the deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant by an order of the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers is violative of the constitutional protection under Art. 21 of the Constitution.

6. Article 21 is in these terms:

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

7. The term law in Art. 21 was the subject of an elaborate discussion in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88, Kania, C. J. at pp. 111113 (of SCR), said that the term law in that Article must mean the law of the State or enacted law, and not rules of natural justice. Fazl Ali, J. who was in the minority, said at p. 169 (of SCR), that law mus