A clause in a Dar Taluk Patta which barred the Dar Talukdar from claiming compensation for land made "khas" by the Government for construction of roads, paths etc. did not bar the Dar Talukdar from claiming compensation for land acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act.

Judgement

RAMASWAMI, J.:- These appeals are brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, Tripura in Civil First Appeals Nos. 10 to 14 and 18 of 1959 whereby the appeal of respondent No. 1 who had a Dar Talukdari right, was allowed and respondent No. 1 was held to be entitled to compensation amounting to Rs. 1,62,905 and odd.

2. The Kayemi Taluk No. 154 of Mouja Chaliarjala stood in the name of Brajendra Kumar Das Gupta under a Patta dated 12th November, 1918 T. E. The Taluk comprised of an area of 383 and odd drones or roughly 2,500 acres. Out of the said Taluk, a Dar Taluk was created by Brajendra Kumar Das Gupta on 11th August, 1928 T. E. in respect of 355 and odd drones after deducting 27 and odd drones in possession of the tenants. Subsequently the management of the estate of Brajendra Kumar Das Gupta was taken over by the Court of Wards. The Dar Taluk of the Ishanpur Tea Company was sold in auction and purchased by the Court of Wards in or about 1930. The Court of Wards thereafter agreed to execute a fresh Dar Taluk Patta in respect of 355 and odd drones out of the total area of 383 and odd drones in favour of Sarala Sundari Das Gupta, wife of Brajendra Das Gupta. On the basis of the agreement, Sarala Sundari Das Gupta entered into an agreement in February, 1933, with respondent No. 1 in respect of the Dar Taluk. By that agreement, Sarala Sundari Das Gupta and respondent No. 1 were to enjoy the land and run the tea estate as partners. On 1st February, 1943 T. E. (May 1933) a Patta was granted by the Court of Wards in respect of the said 355 and odd drones to Sarala Sundari Das Gupta and clause 2 of the said patta provided that there was to be a survey to fix the exact extent of the boundaries mentioned. On 13th April, 1944 T. E. (July 1934) Sarala Sundari Das Gupta conveyed the entire Dar Taluk right to respondent No. 1 and in the said deed it was mentioned that the land under the Dar Taluk measuring 355 and odd drones was the balance of 383 and odd drones after deducting 27 and odd drones in possession of the tenants. Respondent No. 1 later on raised a dispute and by his order dated September 20, 1950, the Settlement Officer held that respondent No. l was entitled only to 290 and odd drones and the balance of the land was in the possession of the tenants. It is not necessary, in these appeals, to describe in detail the legal proceedings further taken by respondent No 1 with regard to the claim of the tenants. On May 29, 1951, the Government of Tripura in exercise of its powers under Section 29 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act 19 of 1950) requisitioned the land described in the Schedule thereto for rehabilitating the displaced persons. More than 1000 acres of land requisitioned was in Kayemi Taluk No. 154 and the possession of the land requisitioned was taken on June 11, 1951. Thereafter, in the year 1953 the said lands were formally acquired under the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948. In 1955, land acquisition proceedings were started in respect of the requisitioned lands to the extent of 1020.59 acres. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award on April 6, 1956 and, at the instance of respondent No. 1 and the tenants who were affected, the Land Acquisition Officer made 7 references under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the apportionment of the compensation. The case of Amarendra Chandra Das Gupta before the District Judge was that there was a covenant in the Dar Taluka lease in favour of Sarala Sundari Das Gupta that in case of compulsory acquisition, the whole of the compensation money for land should be received by the superior landlord alone and that Dar Talukdar would not be entitled to any share in the same and that respondent No. 1 was bound by the terms of the lease. Respondent No. 1, however, contended that the covenant, properly construed, only meant that if the lands were acquired by the Government for construction of road