An Act passed by the Central or the State Legislature cannot be said to be an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value.

Judgement

SHELAT, J. :- The appellant company filed suit No. 16 of 1963 against the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the Union of India, inter alia, praying for a permanent injunction restraining the State of Uttar Pradesh, its servants and agents from realising or from proceeding to realise sugar cane cess and purchase tax amounting to Rs. 33 lakhs and odd charged under the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956 read with U.P. Sugar cane cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act IX of 1961. In the said suit, the appellant company, inter alia, alleged that the Acts for the diverse reasons set out therein were invalid and void and therefore the State was not entitled to levy, collect or recover the said cess or the purchase tax and prayed, as aforesaid, that the State should be restrained from proceeding to realise the said cess or tax. The appellant-company paid court-fees on its said plaint under sub-section (iv-B) (b) of Section 7 on the footing that the relief sought in the suit was an injunction. The Chief Inspector of Stamps objected to the court-fees being paid under Clause (b) of Sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 contending that the court-fees payable were as provided under sub-section (iv) (a) of Section 7 or under sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 that is to say, on the footing that the suit was for a declaratory decree where consequential relief prayed for was an injunction or on the footing that the suit involved cancellation of or of adjudging void an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The trial Judge rejected the objections and held that the court-fees payable were adequate as Clause (b) of sub-section (iv-B) of Section 7 applied. The Chief Inspector of Stamps thereupon filed a revision application before the High Court reiterating the said objections. The High Court rejected the contention that Section 7 (iv) (a) applied but held that sub-sec. (iv-A) of Section 7 applied as the said Acts were instruments securing money within the meaning of that sub-section and that though the relief claimed in the suit was injunction, in substance and effect the suit involved adjudgment of the said Acts as void. Hence this appeal by special leave.

2. Sub-section (iv-A) of Section 7 reads as follows :-

"For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decree-In suits for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable..... an instrument securing money or other property having such value."

3. The question which falls for determination is whether an Act passed by the Central or the State Legislature can be said to be an instrument and, if so, an instrument securing money or other property having such value. The Court-fees Act does not define the word instrument . That being so we have to turn for the connotation of the word instrument to its ordinary dictionary meaning. According to Stroud s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 1472. instrument means a writing and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind. Semble, the word may include an Act of Parliament (see Deed of Settlement) so, in the Trustee Act, 1925 (15 Geo, 5, c. 18), S. 68 ........ (11) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. c. 41) Section 2 (xiii), instrument includes deed, will, inclosure, award and Act of Parliament". Thus, an instrument may include a statute enacted by Parliament if the particular statute in its context includes it as an instrument. According to Jowitt s Dictionary of English Law, p. 984 instrument means "a formal legal writing, e. g., a record, charter deed of transfer or agreement". It is, however, observed that under the Law of Property Act, 1925, Section 205 (1) (viii), instrument for the purposes of this Act does not include a statute unless the statute creates a settlement. "An instrument is a writing and generally means a writing of a formal nature. But where there is a power to appoint by any deed or inst