Judgement

BACHAWAT, J. : On March 19, 1963 respondent No. 1 on behalf of 36 employees of the Lonand Grampanchayat applied to the Authority appointed under S. 20 (1) of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 for a direction upon the Grampanchayat to pay to the employees overtime wages and damages. A number of employees claimed overtime wages from October 23, 1960 for a period of two years two months and nine days. One employee claimed wages for a period of seven years and nine months, one claimed wages for six years and ten months and another claimed wages for three years. By an order dated September 18, 1963 the Authority held that the application should be entertained in respect of the claims for the period subsequent to January 1, 1961 as the employees had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of six months. A petition challenging this order under Art. 227 of the Constitution was summarily dismissed by the Bombay High Court. From the order of the High Court, the present appeal has been filed by special leave.

2. An application for a direction on the employer to pay minimum wages and other amounts payable under the Minimum Wages Act may be made under S. 20 (2) of the Act to the Authority appointed under S. 20 (1). The first proviso to S. 20 (2) requires that

"every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable."

The second proviso to S. 20 (2) is in these terms:-

"Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."

3. The Authority has a discretion to condone the delay in presenting the application provided sufficient cause for the entire delay is shown to its satisfaction. This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just, see Keighley s case, (l609) l0 Co. Rep 139 a

4. The wording of the second proviso is similar to the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion under S. 5 should be exercised :

"We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood : the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellants."

This decision received the approval of this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu v Jadumoni Mangaraj. 1955-1 SCR 140 at p. 146 : and Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962-2 SCR 762 at p. 767 : The words "sufficient cause" in the second proviso to S. 20 (2) should receive similar liberal construction.

5. No appeal lies from an order of the Authority under S 20. But the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the tribunal under Art 227 of the Constitution. This power is not greater than the power under Art. 226 and is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, see Nagendra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, 1958 SCR 1240 at p. 1272 : The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires. In Sitaram Ramcharan v. M. N. Nagarshana, l960-1 SCR 875 at p. 884 : this Court held that a finding of fact by the authority under the similarly worded second proviso to S. 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 could not be challenged in a petition under Art. 227. The High Court may refuse to interf