A statute applies to State as much it does to a citizen unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation.

Judgement

SHELAT, J. : The Himachal Pradesh State legislature passed the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on June 17, 1953 and the Act was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1955. The validity of the Act was thereafter successfully impugned (cf. Shri Vinod Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 160: The Parliament then passed the Validating Act, 56 of 1958. That Act was itself then challenged in Jadab Singh v. Himachal Pradesh Administration, 1960-3 SCR 755: but the challenge was rejected and the Act since then remains on the statute book as a valid piece of legislation.

2. On June 4, 1959 the respondent made an application under S. 11 of the Act for acquiring proprietary rights in the lands set out therein claiming to be the cultivating tenant of those lands and produced a copy of Jamabandhi in support of his claim. He stated that he was the tenant of the Union of India in respect of the said lands, that he was cultivating the said lands, that he was paying Rs. 35/5/- annually as rent and Rs. 23/8/- as annual land revenue and other rates and cesses assessed on the said lands and that he was willing to pay compensation as provided by the Act. On November 26, 1959 the Forest Department on behalf of the Union filed objections alleging that the application was incompetent, that the said lands formed part of the protected forest, that the relationship between the respondent and the Union was not that of landlord and tenant, that the Union being the paramount owner could not be characterised as landlord qua the respondent, that a number of trees stood on the said lands, that the respondent was merely a lessee of the said lands which were a forest area, that the entries in the revenue record in respect of the said lands were incorrect and could not be relied on in an application under Section 11 and consequently the Compensation Officer, Mahasu, had no jurisdiction to grant. The Compensation Officer held that the said area was not a forest area that there were no trees on the said lands as alleged and that since the respondent was mentioned as an occupancy tenant in the Jamabandhi he was entitled to proprietary rights in the said ends on his paying compensation which he fixed at Rs. 76.40nP. The Forest Department thereupon filed an appeal before the District Judge, Mahasu, principally on the ground that the Compensation Officer had not followed the procedure laid down in the Act and had not given to the Forest Department reasonable opportunity to put for ward its case. The Forest Department did not dispute in the said appeal that the appellant held the said lands as a tenant of the Government. On July 26, 1960 the District Judge allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Compensation Officer directing him to raise proper issues and decide the matter in accordance with law. Accordingly, the Compensation Officer raised four issues, viz., whether there were trees on the said lands, whether the lands formed part of the forest, whether the respondent was a tenant in respect of the said lands and whether there was any impediment in the way of granting proprietary rights to him. The Compensation Officer held that the respondent was a tenant, that there was no impediment in granting proprietary rights to him and allowed once again the respondents application. The appeal by the Union against the said order before the District Judge failed. The District Judge held that the respondent was the tenant of the Union and that the Act applied to the said lands as also to the Union. The Union filed a Second Appeal before the Judicial Commissioner challenging the correctness of the District Judge s said order. Both the Compensation Officer and the District Judge having held on the strength of the Jamabandhi that the respondent was the occupancy tenant in respect of the said lands, the only questions raised in the Second Appeal were (1) that