SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. BACHAWAT AND K.S. HEGDE, JJ.
Nirshi Dhobin and another, Appellants
Versus
Dr. Sudhir Kumar Mukherjee and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 955 of 1965,
D/- 30-7-1969.
Advocates appeared
Mr. U. P. Singh, for Appellants; Mr. K. K. Sinha, for Respondent No. 1.
Bihar Tenancy Act - Transfer of Property Act - Sections 117 and 123 - Bengal Tenancy Act - Section 49, Cl. (6) – Lease - Possession of homestead - One Chakrapani Singh was lessee of a plot which consisted of agricultural lands as well as a homestead - Homestead was later separately leased to defendants 1 and 2 (appellants) - Thereafter plaintiffs purchased rights of main lessee and sued appellants for possession of homestead - Appellants resisted suit mainly on ground that it had not been brought in accordance with provisions or Act and hence not maintainable - Held, Earlier decisions under the Hindu Law cannot be followed in view of the change in law effected by Section 123 of Transfer of Property Act - It is clear that rule that where the terms of a statute or ordinance are clear then even a long and uniform course of Judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, if it is contrary to clear meaning of enactment is inapplicable to decisions on the basis of which titles and transactions must have been founded - Appeal allowed.
Judgment
HEGDE, J.: In this case a Full Bench of the Patna High Court differing from the view taken in a series of earlier decisions of that High Court as well as the High Court of Calcutta held that the provisions of Bihar Tenancy Act (to be briefly referred to hereinafter as the Act) do not apply to a lease of a homestead though that homestead was a part of an earlier lease which was admittedly an agricultural lease and to which the provisions of the Act applied. The appellant challenges the correctness of that decision.
2. The relevant facts as found by the fact finding courts are:- One Chakrapani Singh was the lessee of a plot which consisted of agricultural lands as well as a homestead. The homestead was later separately leased to defendants 1 and 2 (appellants). Thereafter the plaintiffs purchased the rights of the main lessee and sued the appellants for possession of the homestead. The appellants resisted the suit mainly on the ground that it had not been brought in accordance with the provisions or the Act and hence not maintainable. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the lease is invalid as it did not conform to the provisions of Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore their are entitled to evict the appellants. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit but the first Appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed it. It followed the earlier rulings of the Patna High Court to the effect that if the main lease is a lease for agricultural purposes all sub-leases of portions of that leasehold should also be considered as agricultural leases despite the fact that a particular sub-lease may be that of a homestead only. The plaintiffs took the matter in second appeal to the High Court which was decided by a Full Bench which allowed the appeal as mentioned earlier.
3. Two questions that arise for decisions are (1) was the High Court right in holding that the lease in favour of the appellants is governed by Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act and (2) whether in view of the uniform view taken in the earlier decisions during a period of nearly 55 years the High Court was justified in reopening the question.
4. Till the decision under appeal High Courts of Patna and Calcutta proceeded on the basis that if the main lease is governed by the provisions of the Act and consequently taken out of the scope of the Transfer of Property Act then it must be held that all subleases of portions of the properties included in the main lease are agricultural leases; otherwise the main lease would cease to be a purely agricultural lease as it must be held to relate to both agricultural and non-agricultural lands. We agree with the Full Bench that the ratio of these decisions is open to question. If the legal position had not been firmly settled by a long chain of decisions commencing from 1903 onwards, it is likely that we would have concurred with the view taken by the Full Bench. But if we do so we would be unsettling a settled view of the law on the basis of which various rights must have been created, transactions entered into and titles founded. The rule laid down in the earlier decision was never departed from in the past. The Act was amended a number of times but yet the legislature did not think it necessary to alter or modify the said rule. Different considerations would have arisen if the disputed interpretation related to a penal provision or the same is detrimental to public interest or causes public inconvenience. Law is not always logic. It is a part of life and more so in a democratic set up. In law finality is of utmost importance. Unless so required in public interest, questions of law firmly settled by a long course of decisions should not ordinarily be disturbed and it is all the more so in the case of an interpretation affecting property rights. In the instant case, there were no compelling reasons for the High Court to depart from the rule laid down earlier. The decision of
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