Judgment

SHAH, J. : Firm Lalmandas Chhadammalal - hereinafter called the plaintiffs - commenced an action against "Mohan Singh Ratan Lal, through its partners Mohan Singh and Ratan Lal", in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Nainital, for a decree for Rs. 12,883 and interest thereon for value of goods supplied. Ratan Lal denied liability for payment of the amount claimed. Mohan Singh by a separate written statement admitted that goods were supplied by the plaintiffs to the firm, but submitted that he was liable only for one-fifth of the amount claimed. The Trial Judge decreed the claim of the plaintiff in its entirety against "Mohan Singh and Ratan Lal and the firm known as Mohan Singh Ratan Lal".

2. Against the decree, Ratan Lal alone appealed to the High Court of Allahabad. Mohan Singh was impleaded as the second respondent in the appeal. The notice of appeal sent to Mohan Singh was returned unserved and an application made by counsel for the appellant to serve Mohan Singh "in the ordinary course as well as by registered post" was not disposed of by the Court. On July 9, 1963 Ratan Lal applied that it was "detected that there had been no service of the notice the appeal upon Mohan Singh and it was essential for the ends of justice that notice of appeal may be served upon Mohan Singh". The Court by order dated July 10, 1963, rejected the application and proceeded to hear the appeal. The Court was of the view that since there was a joint decree against Ratan Lal and Mohan Singh in a suit founded on a joint cause of action and the decree against Mohan Singh had become final, Ratan Lal could not claim to be heard on his appeal. The High Court observed :

"If we here him (Ratan Lal) the result may be that on the success of his appeal there will be two conflicting decisions between the "same parties in the same suit based on the same cause of action. Furthermore, the appellant has not taken steps to serve the second respondent (Mohan Singh) and the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution. On both these grounds we dismiss this appeal."

Against the order passed by the High Court this appeal has been preferred with special leave.

3. In our view the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal could not be dismissed on the ground that Mohan Singh was not served with the notice of appeal, nor could the appeal be dismissed on the ground that there was a possibility of two conflicting decrees. Order 41, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides :

"Where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be."

The object of the rule is to enable one of the parties to a suit to obtain relief in appeal when the decree appealed from proceeds on a ground common to him and others. The Court in such an appeal may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the parties who are in the same interest as the appellant. There was some conflict of judicial opinion in the High Courts on the question whether power under Order 41, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be exercised where all the parties against whom a decree is passed on a ground which is common to them are not impleaded in the appeal. The preponderance of authority in the High Court was that even in the absence of a person against whom a decree has been passed on a ground common with the appellant the appeal was maintainable and appropriate relief may be granted. It is, however, unnecessary to examine those decisions for, in our judgment, the question has been considered by this Court in Karam Singh Sobti v. Shri Pratap Chand, (1964) 4 SCR 647. In that case a landlord of certain premises filed an action in ejectment against the tenant an