Judgment

HEGDE, J.:- The question for decision in this appeal by certificate is short but important and that question is what are the principles governing the assessment of damages under Section 1-A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act (Act XIII of 1855) (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act)?

2. One Krishnamoorthy son of plaintiffs 1 and 2 aged about 8 years was hit by a bus owned by the 1st defendant (who died during the pendency of this suit) and driven by the second defendant on February 26, 1956. As a result of that accident Krishnamoorthy sustained very serve injuries. He became unconscious almost immediately after the accident and died in the hospital on the early morning of February 28, 1956. Krishnamoorthy was the eldest son of plaintiffs 1 and 2. Both the Courts have come to the conclusion that he was a bright boy and was at the top of his class in his school. At the time of his death he was in Standard III. His parents are affluent. They could have afforded to give him good education. Hence there was a bright future for him. The plaintiffs claimed a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as damages under Secs. 1A and 2 of the Act. The District Judge computed the damages under Sections 1A and 2 at Rs. 5,000/-. In appeal the High Court determined the damages under Section 1A at Rs. 5,000/- and under Section 2 at Rs. 1,000/-. Aggrieved by that decision, the plaintiffs have brought this appeal.

3. We shall first read Section 1A and 2 for the purpose of ascertaining the principles governing the assessment of the damages under those sections. Section 1A reads:

"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime.

Every such action or suit shall be for benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased;"

Section 2 reads thus:

"Provided always that not more than one action or suit shall be brought for, and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint. Provided that, in any such action or suit, the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased."

4. The rights under the two provisions are quite distinct and independent. Under the former section the damages are made payable to one or the other relations enumerated therein whereas the latter section provides for the recoupment of any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased by the wrongful act complained of. Sometimes, the beneficiaries under the two provisions may be the same. Section 1-A is in substance a reproduction of the English Fatal Accidents Acts 9 and 10 Vict. Ch. 93 known as the Lord Campbell s Acts. Section 2 corresponds to one of the provisions in the English Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934.

5. The scope of Section 1 of the Campbell s Acts was considered by the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Dufferyn Associated Collieries Ltd., (1942 Ac 601). Dealing with the mode of assessment of damages under that Section Lord Russel of Killowen observed:

"The general rule which has always prevailed in regard to the assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act is well settled, namely, that any benefit accruing to a dependant by reason of the relevant death must be taken into account. Under those Acts the