Judgment

RAY, J.:- This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High court of Bombay dated 5th December, 1966 dismissing in limine the appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 16th August, 1966 passed by the Session Judge, Sholapur. The High Court by an order dated 3rd April, 1967 also refused leave to appeal to this Court.

2. The appellant was accused No. 1. He was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

3. Broadly stated, the charge against the appellant was that he in conspiracy with his brother, accused No. 2, committed murder of Rayansidhappa Shivappa Patil and Mahadeo Sidran Patil. The defence of both the appellant and his brother was one of total denial.

4. The right to prefer an appeal from sentence of Court of Sessions is conferred by Section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The right to appeal is one both on a matter of fact and a matter of law. It is only in cases where there is a trial by jury that the right to appeal is under Section 418 confined only to a matter of law.

5. This Court in several decisions dealt with Section 410 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the rights of the appellant thereunder. References may be made to one of the earlier decisions of this Court in Mushtak Hussain v. State of Bombay, 1953 SCR 809 and the recent unreported decision in Govinda Kadtuji Kadam v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 1969, D/- 9-2-1970 (SC) where several previous decisions of this Court have been noticed.

6. The following principles emerge from the decisions; first, the Appellate Court undoubtedly has power of summary dismissal; secondly, if the appeal raises arguable and substantial points the High Court should give reasons for rejection of appeal; thirdly, rejection of an appeal by using only one word of dismissal causes difficulties and embarrassment in finding out the reasons which weighed with the High Court in dismissal of the appeal in limine; fourthly this Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of West Bengal, (1964) 3 SCR 237 held that the High Court should not summarily reject criminal appeals if they raise arguable and substantial points.

7. As to what is an arguable and a substantial point may be illustrated with reference to a few decisions.

8. In Narayan Swami v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) 2 SCR 88 this Court stated that a ground in preferring an appeal from the judgment of the Sessions Court that a gross illegality was committed in relying upon the evidence given by a co-accused in a dacoity case and using the answers given by him as a co-accused against the accused appellant would be a substantial question. Again it was noticed that denial of an opportunity to an appellant in a dacoity case of being heard as required under Section 479A of the Criminal Procedure Code would be an arguable point.

9. In an unreported decision of this Court in Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1969, D/- 17-9-1969 (SC), it was held that failure to consider the position in which the appellant was placed when his immediate superior admittedly ordered him to bring out the currency notes which were required not for the purpose of investigation of any case but only for the purpose of being shown to a person whom the sub-inspector wanted to help in laying down a new trap would be a substantial ground in a conviction under Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.

10. In another unreported decision of this court in Vishwanath Shankar Beldar v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 1969, D/- 18-9-1969 (SC) it was said that if the trial Judge did not accept the witness as a wholly truthful witness in the light of reports sent by police officers and his statement under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and remarked that a portion of the evidence was clearly an improvement it was necessary for the High Court to consider the evidence afresh.

11. In an