Judgment

SHAH, J. :- M/s. Tarapore & Company - hereinafter called the plaintiffs - applied in Suit No. 118 of 1967 for an interim injunction restraining the Bank of India Ltd. - the first defendant in the suit - form taking any steps in pursuance of a letter of credit opened in favour of M/s. V/O Tractors Export, Moscow, the second defendant. Ramamurthi, J., by order dated April 12, 1968, granted an interim injunction restraining encashment of the letter of credit pending disposal of the suit. In appeals under the Letters Patent preferred by the second defendant, the High Court of Madras set aside that order. Against the orders passed in the two appeals, the plaintiffs applied for certificate under Arts 133 (1)(a) and 133 (1)(b) of the Constitution. The High Court observed that an order granting interim injunction "is a final order, as far as this Court is concerned, determining the rights of parties within this lis or proceeding, which is independent though ancillary to the suit," and they were competent to grant the certificate.

2. By our order dated October 28, 1968, we ordered that the certificate granted by the High Court do stand revoked. We set out the reasons in support of that order. Article 133(1) provides, insofar as it is material:

"(1) An appeal shall lie to the SC from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies-

(a) that the amount of value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or

(b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or

(c).........where the judgment decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause (c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law."

The suit filed by the plaintiffs is a civil proceeding, and the suit involves some claim or question respecting property of not less than twenty thousand rupees. That is a matter not in dispute.

3. The expression "judgment" in Art. 133 (1) in the context in which it occurs means a final adjudication by the Court of rights of the parties, and that an interlocutory judgment even if it decides an issue or issues without finally determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is not a judgment, however, cardinal the issue may be. In the present case not even an issue has been decided, and it is not contended that the order of the High Court amounts to a judgment or a decree. The expression "final order", it has been held by a long course of authorities, occurring in Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution means a final decision on the rights of the parties in dispute in a suit or proceeding; if the rights of the parties in dispute in the suit or proceeding remain to be tried, after the order, the order is not final.

4. In Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas Ratan Chand, 47 Ind App 124 it was held by the Judicial Committee that an order of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind vacating an order of stay granted under Section 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, and refusing to stay a proceeding was not a final order within the meaning of Section 109 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Viscount Cave referred to Salaman v. Warner, (1891) 1 QB 734, Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council, (1903) 1 KB 547 and Issacs v. Salbstein, (1916) 1 KB 139 and observed:

"The effect of those and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determine