Judgment

SHAH, J.: I agree that Appeal No. 2122 of 1969 must be dismissed. I also agree that if the State Government fails to dispose of the application for grant of a mining lease within the time prescribed by the rules, the failure results in refusal to grant the lease. The High Court was in error in holding that in the absence of a provision enacting that even if the application stands rejected for failure to pass an order within the time prescribed, the State Government has power to issue a licence. The High Court was again in error in holding that because of the representations made by the State before Bhimasankaran, J., in Writ Petition No. 1237 of 1957 the State Government were estopped from contending that the application was by the first respondent must be deemed to have been refused.

2. But I am unable to agree that the Central Government was competent in exercise of its power of review, against the order of the State Government made in compliance with the order of Basi Reddy, J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957, to set aside the order so as in effect to overrule the judgment of the High Court.

3. The relevant facts may be recalled. The Central Government made an order on September 25, 1957, in the review application filed by the first respondent holding that his application was premature and that it was for the State Government to dispose of the application within six months of August 31, 1957. The first respondent then moved Petition No. 888 of 1957 for a mandamus directing the State Government to dispose of his application. By order dated November 4, 1958, Basi Reddy, J. observed that Rule 57 (2) as amended by S. R. O. No. 2753 "is intended for the benefit of the applicant and does not relieve the State from performing the statutory functions imposed on it under Rules 17 (1) and 17 (2) viz. of granting or refusing the licence." The State Government then heard the application and granted the mining lease for which the first respondent had applied on September 15, 1953. Against that order the appellant moved a review petition. The Central Government by order dated February 15, 1965, allowed the review petition and set aside the grant in favour of the first respondent.

4. Granting that the High Court erroneously issued a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to perform its functions it was, in my judgment, not open to the Central Government in effect to exercise appellate authority over the judgment of the High Court. If the order was erroneous it could be set aside by an appropriate proceeding before a Division Bench of the High Court or before this Court. But the Central Government had no power to set aside the order on the view that the High Court had reached an erroneous conclusion. To accede to the contention that the executive has the power, when exercising quasi judicial functions, to sit in appeal over the decision of the High Court is to destroy the scheme of division of powers under our Constitution. I see no reason for making a distinction between the effect of an order made by the High Court and carried out by the State, and an order made by the High Court and confirmed in appeal by this Court and carried out by the State. In my view Article 141 of the Constitution has no bearing on that question. If this Court decided a question of law or of fact or a mixed question of law and fact arising in an appeal against an order passed by the High Court in a writ petition against the action of the State Government granting or refusing to grant a licence, it would not, in my judgment, be open to the Central Government, hearing a review petition against the order of the State Government in compliance with the order of this Court, to set aside the order so as to upset the order of this Court. That is so, not because of Article 141, but because neither the Legislature nor the executive is invested with powers to supersede judgments of Courts. The Legislature may if competent in that behalf change the law but can