Judgment

HEGDE J. : This appeal by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution arises from the decision of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing the appellant s writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In that writ petition, the appellant asked the High Court to quash the entertainment tax of Rs. 67,500 levied on it for the period from 1-4-1959 to 30-9-1959. The High Court rejected that prayer.

2. The appellant is the owner of Veena Cinema in the town of Patna. As required by the provisions of the Bihar Entertainment Tax Act, 1948 (Bihar Act XXXV of 1948) (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the rules framed thereunder, for the period 1-4-1959 to 30-9-1959, the appellant submitted a return showing a tax liability of Rs. 36,860. It deposited that amount. But the Additional Superintendent, Commercial Taxes Patna rejected its return and assessed it on the basis of best judgment and levied a tax of Rs. 67,500 on it for the period in question. The appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes and thereafter took up the matter in revision before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. That officer made some minor modification in the assessment order; but he substantially upheld the order of the Additional Superintendent. Aggrieved by that order, the appellant took up the matter to the High Court as mentioned above.

3. Before the High Court as well as this Court the appellant raised four questions of law namely (1) Rule 28(4) of the rules is beyond the rule-making power conferred on the State Government under S. 21 of the Act; (2) No power is given either under the provisions of the Act or under the rules to assess on the basis of best judgment; (3) Rule 28(4) is repugnant to Section 9(2) of the Act and (4) The assessing authority had arbitrarily fixed the assessee s receipts.

4. The return submitted by the appellant was rejected by the authorities on the grounds that the books of account produced by the appellant were entirely unreliable that the appellant had maintained duplicate sets of tickets and had suppressed the sale of the tickets. These findings were based on the result of a surprise inspection. All the authorities under the Act have concurrently come to the conclusion that the account-books produced by the appellant were entirely unreliable; that it had maintained duplicate sets of tickets and that it suppressed the sale of tickets. These findings were not challenged before the High Court and therefore we did not allow the learned Counsel for the appellant to challenge those findings. In view of those findings, it cannot be denied that the taxing authorities were justified in rejecting the return submitted by the appellant.

5. Section 9 of the Act deals with submission of returns and payment and recovery of entertainment. That section does not prescribe the procedure to be adopted in determining the receipts of the assessee by the sale of tickets. Sub-section (1) of that section merely says that every proprietor of entertainment shall furnish such returns by such dates and to such authority as may be prescribed. No provision in the Act deals with the mode of determination of tax payable by an assessee. That aspect of the matter is left to be governed by the rules to be made. Section 21 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the State Government may make rules, consistent with the Act for securing the payment of entertainment tax and generally for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. The power given under this provision is wide enough to make rules for the determination of the tax liability of an assessee. The mode and the manner in which that liability is to be determined can be provided under the rules. The main purpose of the Act is to levy and collect entertainment tax. Therefore it is idle to say that in exercise of the powers conferr