Judgment

SIKRI, J.: This appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts. Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council, Raipur, under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 - hereinafter referred to as the Act - and found that 50 transport workers, including drivers, conductors, mechanics etc., had been employed by the Council but the Council had not been registered as required under S. 3 (1) of the Act. He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, who issued summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council and the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur. The accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections. Before the Magistrate two points were taken: (1) that the Municipal Council was not a motor transport undertaking within S. 2 (g) of the Act, and (2) that the Council was exempt under S. 38 of the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or injured persons and for maintenance of public order, i.e., for transporting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges. The Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused persons.

2. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Raipur, who, agreeing with the findings of the Magistrate, dismissed the revision. The State then filed a revision under S. 439, Cr. P. C. Three points were debated before the High Court: (1) whether a revision lay under S. 439, Cr. P. C. The contention was that the accused had been acquitted and not discharged and, therefore, only an appeal under S. 417, Cr. P. C., lay: (2) that the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" in S. 2 (g); and (3) that the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal Council are exempt under S. 38 (1) of the Act.

3. The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that a revision lay under S. 439, Cr. P. C., because the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. On the second point the High Court held that the Municipal Council fell within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking". On the third point the High Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not come within the exemption under S. 38 of the Act.

4. The same points have been debated before us by the learned counsel. Coming to the first point, we agree with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. It is true that it is a summons case and no formal charge is necessary to be framed under S. 242, Cr. P. C., but even so here when the accused appeared, before anything was done the accused filed a preliminary objection and no particulars of the offence of which the accused was charged were ever stated to him.

5. Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act. It is necessary to set out the relevant definitions in S. 2 of the Act.

"2 (g) "motor transport undertaking" means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier

(n) all other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act." The expression "private carrier" is defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2) of section 42." A "transport vehicle" is defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean "a public service