SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.
Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd., Appellant
Versus
The State of U.P. and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 480 of 1967, D/- 18-8-1969.
Advocates appeared
Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Senior Advocate (M/s. B. Datta and D. N. Misra, Advocates, and M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and O. C. Mathur, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., with him), for Appellant; Mr. O. P. Rana, Advocate, for Respondent No. 1; M/s. J. P. Goyal Sobhag Mal Jain and S. P. Singh, Advocates, for Respondent No. 4.
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 - Section 6 (6) and 4 (k) - Code of Civil Procedure - Section 152 - Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 - Rule 28 - Appointed - Accidental omission - Appeal by special leave - Central Wage Board for sugar industry, appointed by Union Government for determining a wage-structure, revision of categories of workmen, their fitment into such categories and for fixing principles governing grant of bonus, had made certain recommendations - 72 Amongst its recommendations, Wage Board had recommended that its decision should be brought into effect - By its notification dated U.P. Government accepted those recommendations including one that they should be brought into force with effect - Company thereafter fitted two workmen in said two grades from a date one month hence after award became enforceable and not - Whether there is under Act any time limit within which correction of award can be made – Held, Court are also not impressed with difficulty which High Court supposed would result in case Section 6 (6) is interpreted as not having by implication any time limit within which correctional power can be exercised by any of three adjudicating authorities - It may be that correction of an award might to a certain extent have an unsettling effect to what has already become settled, but correction is made not due to any fault of parties but of adjudicating authority whose accidental slip or omission cannot be allowed to prejudice interests of parties - In this view it is not necessary to consider Section 11B or its effect especially as it is nobody s case that it was at any stage invoked or resorted to - In view that Court have taken it was Section 6 (6) and not Section 11 B which could on facts of this case be resorted to - Appeal is dismissed though for reasons different from those given by the High Court - Appellant-company will pay costs of this appeal to respondents - Appeal dismissed
Judgment
SHELAT, J. : Two question arise for determination in this appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, namely, (1) whether a correction in its award by the Labour Court, Lucknow, was one of an error arising from an accidental omission within the meaning of Sec. 6 (6) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and (2) whether, even if it was so, it could so correct after its award was published and held become enforceable.
2. The Central Wage Board for sugar industry, appointed by the Union Government for determining a wage-structure, revision of categories of workmen, their fitment into such categories and for fixing the principles governing the grant of bonus, had made certain recommendations. 72 Amongst its recommendations, the Wage Board had recommended that its decision should be brought into effect as from November 1, 1960. By its notification dated April 27, 1961, the U.P. Government accepted those recommendations including the one that they should be brought into force with effect from November 1, 1960. On a dispute having arisen between the appellant-company and its workmen on the company failing to implement the said recommendations, the State Government referred it to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 4 (k) of the Act. The dispute involved two questions (1) whether the company should fit the workmen named in the reference in the revised categories and in the new wage scales and (2) if so, with effect from what date. By its award dated November 6, 1963 the Labour Court held that two of the said workmen should be fitted in Grade II (B) and Grade IV respectively and directed the company to do so within one month after the award became enforceable. It, however, ommitted to fix the date from which such fitment should have the effect. On December 7, 1963 the said award was published in the State Gazette. The company thereafter fitted the two workmen in the said two grades from a date one month hence after the award became enforceable and not from November 1, 1960. The workmen s union thereupon applied to the Labour Court to amend its award on the ground that it had omitted to answer the second question arising under the reference and the Labour Court accordingly amended its awarded directing that the two workmen should be placed in the said grades with effect from November 1, 1960. The order amending the said award was gazetted on June 20, 1964. The company filed a petition in the High Court for certiorari and for quashing the said order of amendment. Nigam J., who heard the petition in the first instance dismissed it holding that (1) the Labour Court had made an error arising from an accidental omission to answer the said second question and therefore had the power to correct it under Section 6 (6) of the Act, and (2) even if there was no such error arising from accidental omission, the amendment merely provided what was already contained in the notification dated April 27, 1961, that once the Labour Court had directed the company to fit the workmen in the said grades, such fitment had, under the force of that notification, to take effect from November 1, 1960 and that result was arrived at not by reason of the correction of the award but by force of the original award read with the said notification. On a Letters Patent appeal having been filed against the said judgment, the Appellate Bench of the High Court agreed with Nigam, J., that the correction amounted to one of an error arising from the accidental omission to answer the said second question within the scope of Section 6 (6) of the Act. The Appellate Bench, however, proceeded to examine the various provisions and the scheme of the Act and held (1) that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Act was of a limited character, (2) that it gets seisin of an industrial dispute only when its jurisdiction is invoked by a reference under Sectio
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.